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Entrepreneurs are an important segment of the economy, particularly in terms
of economic development (Baumol, et al. 2007).  However, the study of entrepreneurs
and how they create firms is still an open question (Venkataraman 1998).  In part, this
question remains open as a result of the academic discussion about various definitions
of entrepreneur and the identification of these individuals under each definition.
This dissertation uses the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED)
to study two questions about nascent entrepreneurs.  The first question is about the
identity of these nascent entrepreneurs and if they differ from the self-employed.  The
second question examines what happens to these nascent entrepreneurs over their
periods of firm formation, where they may either successfully begin an operating firm
or choose to quit the effort at firm formation.
For the first question, a probability model of the decision to become an
entrepreneur is analyzed.  It is found that the self-employed are, in fact, a different
group than nascent entrepreneurs, although there are similarities.  The differences
between these groups dominate the similarities.  The differences support the
contention of entrepreneurship researchers, such as Aldrich (1990), that researching
only the self-employed as entrepreneurs introduces selection bias in the study of
entrepreneurship.
For the second question, a competing risks hazard model is used to estimate
the effects of ability, optimism, resources, and management strategy on two possible
outcomes for the nascent entrepreneur – successfully creating an operating firm or
iv
deciding instead to quit the effort.  It is found that the nascent entrepreneur’s ability,
access to resources, and management strategy significantly affect the nascent
entrepreneur’s chances of getting a firm operational.  However, only the self-
employment status of the nascent entrepreneur has a significant effect on a nascent
entrepreneur’s decision to quit the effort of firm formation.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs are an important segment of the economy, particularly in terms
of economic development (Baumol, et al. 2007).  However, the study of entrepreneurs
and how they create firms is still an open question (Venkataraman 1998).  In part, this
question remains open as a result of the academic discussion about the various
definitions of an entrepreneur and the identification of these individuals under each
definition.
In past empirical studies, the entrepreneur has been defined as a self-employed
person (Aldrich 1990).  Additionally, these studies have estimated the probability an
individual is self-employed at a particular point as a function of personal
characteristics.  Aldrich (1990) derogatorily calls this method of studying
entrepreneurship the “traits” method of research.  Aldrich’s criticism of using
probability models of self-employment to study entrepreneurship is based on the
understanding that entrepreneurship is a dynamic process, rather than a choice made
at a particular point in time.  Venkataraman (1998) states that the dynamic nature of
entrepreneurship implies that all proper entrepreneurship research should focus on the
process of firm formation.
Unfortunately, properly defined dynamic data on firm formation has not been
available (Gartner, et al. 2004).  In fact, it can be argued that past research on
entrepreneurship has focused on the self-employed precisely because the self-
2employed can be identified in easily obtainable government datasets, such as the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).  In response to the lack of dynamic
data on entrepreneurship, the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) was
developed by an interdisciplinary group of researchers (Gartner, et al. 2004).  The
PSED fills a void in entrepreneurship data both by defining entrepreneurship
differently from self-employment and by following a sample of entrepreneurs over
time.
This chapter provides a discussion of the problems associated with using self-
employment as a definition of entrepreneurship and how these problems led to the
development of the PSED.  This discussion is followed by a brief overview of the
PSED, and how the PSED has been combined with other data for use in this
dissertation.  Then, a synopsis is given of the two methods used to analyze the data in
the dissertation.  Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary of the findings in the
subsequent chapters and the contributions of this research to the study of
entrepreneurship.
Problems Associated with the Self-Employed Definition of the Entrepreneur
Past economics research, such as Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and
Leighton (1989), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998),
Hamilton (2000), Fairlie (2002), and Lazear (2004, 2005), focus on the entrepreneur
as the self-employed individual.  In part, the focus on self-employment was a response
to the lack of other definitions of the entrepreneur in datasets published by
3government sources.  This reliance on self-employment has been criticized by
entrepreneurship researchers outside the profession as defining entrepreneurship too
narrowly (Aldrich 1990).
In fact, the criticism of the use of self-employment as the definition of
entrepreneurship has centered on the selection bias that may be caused by such a
definition.  Using a wider definition that identifies entrepreneurs at an earlier stage of
firm formation, called nascent entrepreneurship, researchers have noted that the self-
employed are successful nascent entrepreneurs, since the goal of nascent
entrepreneurship is self-employment by the formation of an operating firm
(Venkataraman 1998, Reynolds 1997).  This implies that models of self-employment
suffer from selection bias in comparison with models of entrepreneurship using the
nascent definitions of the entrepreneur.
Using self-employment as the definition of entrepreneur likely biases the
significance estimates of who chooses to be an entrepreneur in policy-relevant ways. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), for instance, find that women are less likely to be
self-employed than men.  Similarly, Lazear (2005) finds that males are more likely to
be self-employed.  However, any conclusions about women’s entrepreneurship based
on studies of the self-employed may be unreliable if entrepreneurs are a larger group
than individuals who are self-employed.
Another potential selection issue caused by using self-employment as the
definition of entrepreneurship is that conclusions about the skills and experiences of
potential entrepreneurs will be incorrect.  For example, Lazear (2004) defines
4entrepreneurship as incorporated self-employment.  Using this definition in an
analysis of a sample of Stanford MBA graduates, he concludes “It is executives and
other administrative personnel who form the bulk of entrepreneurs, and they are found
primarily in construction, retail trade, and professional services.”  Lazear (2004) may
be mistaken in this conclusion, since his definition suffers from two potential
selection issues – incorporation and self-employment.  First, Lazear’s (2004) results
about entrepreneurship are biased towards self-employment.  Then, the results about
the self-employed are further biased towards those that have incorporated.  This
means that Lazear’s (2004) results are biased toward the most successful
entrepreneurs – the successfully incorporated self-employed – since the self-employed
are themselves successful nascent entrepreneurs. 
Finally, several papers conclude that liquidity constraints are binding to
entrepreneurs (Evans and Jovanovic 1989; Evans and Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, et
al. 1994a & 1994b; Blanchflower and Oswald 1998).  These studies – all of which use
some measure of wealth to measure liquidity – come to this conclusion by studying
the self-employed as the exclusive definition of the entrepreneur.  However, the
selection bias due to the use of self-employment means that the wealth effects may be
overestimated while simultaneously underestimating the effects of human capital.
The Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) was developed in
response to criticisms of past entrepreneurship research using cross-sectional data of
the self-employed.  The PSED contains data on 830 nascent entrepreneurs over four
waves from 1998 to 2003, as well as data on a control group of 431 individuals who
5are not nascent entrepreneurs.  Only one wave of data is reported in the PSED on the
control group of respondents who are not nascent entrepreneurs.  However, the PSED
identifies the self-employed as well, which allows for a useful comparison between
definitions of the entrepreneurship used in the literature and one based on firm
formation.  Additionally, the longitudinal data on nascent entrepreneurs is useful for
studying the eventual results of the efforts by nascent entrepreneurs to create firms –
some successful, some not successful.
This dissertation uses the PSED to study two questions about nascent
entrepreneurs.  The first question, in chapter two, is about the identity of these nascent
entrepreneurs and if they differ from the self-employed.  The second question, in
chapter three, is about what happens to these nascent entrepreneurs over their periods
of potential firm formation, where they may either successfully begin an operating
firm or choose to quit the effort at firm formation.  By examining the rate at which
nascent entrepreneurs leave entrepreneurship, chapter three quantifies the selection
bias caused by defining entrepreneurship as self-employment
Data Used in the Dissertation
This dissertation uses data from the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
(PSED) to evaluate the entrepreneurship decision.  Additional regional measures from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics are
constructed and added to the PSED data for analysis in chapters two and three.  The
PSED is detailed in the next section with the additional data detailed in the section
6after that.
The Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED)
Gartner, et al. (2004) explain that the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics (PSED) was developed in response to the need for data that better identify
entrepreneurs at earlier stages of their activity.  The dataset contains responses from
1,261 respondents – 830 identified entrepreneurs and 431 non-entrepreneurs in the
control group.  Previously, researchers had to identify entrepreneurs by using
self-employed individuals in various datasets, such as the National Longitudinal
Survey or the Current Population Survey, or by surveying existing business owners
about their recollections of the early days of their ventures.  The restrictions of
existing data to defining entrepreneurs only as individuals who are self-employed had
two consequences.
The first consequence of past researchers limiting the definition of
entrepreneurship to self-employment was that researchers were investigating the
issues of self-employment and not entrepreneurship.  Although the difference seems
trivial, it does mean that the only entrepreneurs in the data were those that had
successfully created firms, and thus became self-employed.  The result is positive
selection bias to self-employment in that those who planned to setup firms but were
still planning when the data were collected were not included as entrepreneurs, even
though they may have in fact been actively engaged in entrepreneurial activities.
The second consequence of the limitation of entrepreneurship to self-
7employment results from using the recollections of the established business owner. 
The use of firm owners’ recollections means that the results rely heavily on the
accuracy of the entrepreneurs' memories.  This bias means that research based on this
definition of entrepreneur does not include information about uncreated, but planned,
firms.
The PSED solves both of these problems by identifying entrepreneurs
according to the respondent's answers to two questions (Reynolds, et al. 2004).  The
first of these questions is, "Are you, alone or with others, now trying to start a
business?"  The second is, “Are you, alone or with others, now starting a new
business or new venture for your employer?"  If the respondent answers "Yes" to
either of these questions, the respondent is considered a nascent entrepreneur.  If the
respondent answers affirmatively only to the first, the respondent is considered simply
a nascent entrepreneur.  If affirmative only to the second, the respondent is considered
a nascent corporate entrepreneur.  Here, the nascent entrepreneur is identified by
whether the respondent answers "Yes" to at least the first question.
The PSED follows the entrepreneur group over four waves.  Unfortunately,
panel data is unavailable for the control group of individuals who were not involved
in some stage of creating a new business during the first wave of the survey.  The
PSED research consortium did not survey this group in the subsequent waves.  As a
result, any comparison between nascent entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur can use
only the initial wave of the PSED.
Finally, several county-level measures included in the PSED are taken from
8other sources.  The PSED includes Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
identifiers at the state and county level for each respondent.  Additionally, the PSED
reports a number of county-level economic and demographic data for each
respondent, obtained from either the Regional Economic Information System (REIS)
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Census Bureau’s City and
County Data Book (CCDB) (Reynolds 2004).  Finally, three indicator measures for
region location – midwest, south, and west – and are also part of the PSED.  County-
level regressors in this dissertation from the PSED are the percentage of non-farm
proprietorship, population density, per-capita income, income distribution, education,
population growth, and region location.
Data Added to Augment the PSED
While regional measures are included in the PSED, several useful regional
measures of regional economic conditions are missing.  These measures were
collected separately and matched to the PSED data using the included FIPS
identifiers.  Two measures – regional unemployment rate and regional population –
are included as reported by U.S. government sources.  Indicator measures for
micropolitan and rural areas were created separately from regional population.
The regional unemployment rate was taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS).  The unemployment rate is matched to the respondent by FIPS
number.  The unemployment rate is also match according to the year the respondent
completed the phone survey.
9Population-based indicators for micropolitan area and rural area are
constructed from county population measures from the Regional Economic Accounts
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  The county population measures
are matched to the respondent by FIPS identifier and then used to create the indicators
for micropolitan area and for rural area.  A micropolitan area is defined by the U.S.
Census Bureau as a county with a population greater than 10,000 but less than 50,000. 
Counties with more than 50,000 population are considered metropolitan.  Rural
counties are those counties with fewer than 10,000 people.
The dataset that results from the augmentation of the PSED with other
government data is then divided in two distinct datasets for use in the dissertation. 
The first dataset contains survey results from both nascent entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs from the first wave of the PSED.  This dataset is used in chapter two to
study the probability an individual chooses to become an entrepreneur.  The second
dataset contains survey results from only nascent entrepreneurs, but over all four
waves of the PSED.  This dataset is used in chapter three to identify the determinants
of two nascent entrepreneur outcomes – successfully starting an operating firm or
choosing to quit being a nascent entrepreneur.
Methods Used to Study the Entrepreneur
Two methods are employed in this dissertation to examine separate, but
related, issues of entrepreneurship.  The first method, used in chapter two, is a
probability model of an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur.  This
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method is applied to the first dataset.  The second method, employed in chapter three,
is a competing risks hazard model of two potential outcomes of nascent
entrepreneurship – setting up a firm or quitting the effort to start a firm.  The hazard
model is used on the second dataset.
Modeling the Decision to Become an Entrepreneur
Lazear (2005) is among the latest in line of research on entrepreneurship that
employs a probability model of self-employment.  While the probability model has
been criticized in terms of its applicability to the questions of entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Aldrich 1990), it has yielded a greater understanding of what is necessary to be self-
employed.  Additionally, to date no research has been published on whether the
nascent entrepreneur definition of the PSED is truly different from the self-
employment definition used in the past.
A theoretical model of an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur is
constructed by a modification to Lazear (2005) in chapter two.  The primary
difference between this model and Lazear’s is the use of a random utility model. 
Lazear’s (2005) model of the decision to be an entrepreneur is based on the
assumption of income differences between the states of entrepreneurship and
employed work.  The assumption is that an individual will choose entrepreneurship if
the income from doing so is greater than that from paid employment.  However,
Hamilton (2000) finds that the self-employed earn less on average than paid
employees, which implies that the self-employed may be responding to something
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other than higher income.  Benz (2005) demonstrates, by adapting Lazear’s (2005)
model, that the self-employed may be choosing the autonomy that comes from self-
employment over income.  This indicates that entrepreneurs are willing to pay to be
entrepreneurs.
In order to model this willingness-to-pay (WTP) to be an entrepreneur, a
random utility model (RUM) is adapted to this purpose.  Hanemann (1984) is the
foundation for this model.  The RUM is a model of the difference in utility functions
between two states of nature, where the two states of nature can be described by an
identifiable change in income.  Then, the preferences for the differences between
states is identified by the random portion of the RUM.  In the case of
entrepreneurship, the decision to become an entrepreneur is described by the fact that
entrepreneurs prefer entrepreneurship so long as the difference between the income
possible under paid employment and the income possible under self-employment is
not so large as to cause the utility from paid employment to be larger than the utility
from self-employment.  Non-entrepreneurs may have the same preferences for self-
employment, which means that the RUM is able to deal with one particular criticism
of Aldrich (1990) since non-entrepreneurs may become entrepreneurs at any time,
depending on the conditions.  The RUM is then applied to the first wave of the PSED
in order to examine whether the nascent entrepreneur definition used in the PSED
identifies a different group of individuals than the self-employed definition used in
the past.
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Competing Risks Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Outcomes
Three possible options exist for the nascent entrepreneur – remaining a
nascent entrepreneur, starting an operation firm, or quitting as a nascent entrepreneur. 
Parker and Belghitar (2006) used the PSED to study these options with a multinomial
probability model.  However, two of the possibilities – operating or quitting – results
in the nascent entrepreneur leaving the PSED.  This attrition from the data required
Parker and Belghitar (2006) to remove the final wave of the PSED from their data and
to further reduce their estimated dataset to those nascent entrepreneurs that reported in
the remaining waves.  Their final dataset reduces the original PSED sample of 831
nascent entrepreneurs to a dataset of 340.
Chapter three of this dissertation, however, uses a competing risks hazard
model to study the options of the nascent entrepreneur.  Competing risks hazard
models estimate the probability an individual leaves a dataset for a particular reason at
particular time given that the individual is in that dataset and that the individual has
not left the data already.  In relation to the PSED, this means that the probability a
nascent entrepreneur starts an operating firm is actually a model of the nascent
entrepreneur leaving the data for this reason.  Parker and Belghitar (2006) themselves
admit they lose observations due to nascent entrepreneurs leaving the data early for
this reason.
The competing risks hazard model has another advantage in terms of the study
of entrepreneurship.  Venkataraman (1998) states that the proper domain for
entrepreneurship research should be the examination of firm formation.  Aldrich
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(1990) notes that entrepreneurship is a dynamic activity, with individuals switching
between the states of entrepreneur and non-entrepreneur at various points in time. 
Unfortunately, the individual’s switching between states has required researchers to
reduce the number of observations in their research to account for this switching. 
This has resulted in studies with low numbers of observations (e.g., Reynolds 1997),
which is another problem of past entrepreneurship research.  However, the competing
risks hazard model estimates the relationship between an individual’s state of nature
and that individual’s remaining in a dataset.  The result is that the attrition of
respondents due to identifiable states of nature is the actual focus of the competing
risks hazard model, rather than a cause for removing these respondents as in other
estimation methods.
Two potential hazards – successfully starting an operating firm and quitting as
a nascent entrepreneur – are modeled in the competing risks framework in chapter
three.  The dataset used in chapter three, although originally from the same source as
Parker and Belghitar (2006), has almost twice as many observations as Parker and
Belghitar (2006).  In this respect particularly, the competing risks hazard model has
great potential for the study of the dynamics of entrepreneurship.
Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation proceeds with two additional chapters, each of which studies
a particular question about nascent entrepreneurs.  The first question, in chapter two,
is about the identity of these nascent entrepreneurs and if they differ from the self-
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employment.  The second question, in chapter three, is about what happens to these
nascent entrepreneurs over their periods of potential firm formation, where they may
either successfully begin an operating firm or choose to quit the effort at firm
formation.  Conclusions of the dissertation are in chapter 4.
For chapter two, the initial wave of the PSED, both nascent entrepreneurs and
the control group, are used in a probability model of the decision to become an
entrepreneur.  It is found that the self-employed are, in fact, a different group than
nascent entrepreneurs, although there are many similarities.  However, the differences
between these groups dominate the similarities.  The differences support the
contention of entrepreneurship researchers, such as Aldrich (1990), that researching
only the self-employed as entrepreneurs introduces selection bias in the study of
entrepreneurship.
For chapter three, all four waves of the PSED are used, but only of the nascent
entrepreneurs.  This chapter uses a competing risks hazard model to estimate the
effects of ability, optimism, resources, and management strategy on two possible
outcomes for the nascent entrepreneur – successfully creating an operating firm or
deciding instead to quit the effort.  It is found that the nascent entrepreneur’s ability,
access to resources, and management strategy significantly affect the nascent
entrepreneur’s chances of getting a firm operational.  However, only the self-
employment status of the nascent entrepreneur has a significant effect on a nascent
entrepreneur’s decision to quit the effort of firm formation.
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CHAPTER TWO
WHO BECOMES AN ENTREPRENEUR?
AN EXPLORATION OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL DECISION
Entrepreneurs are an important segment of the economy (Baumol, et al. 2007),
but who are these individuals?  If entrepreneurs are different from the rest of society,
how are they different?  If they basically are the same as everyone else, then what
makes them decide to start businesses?  The literature has debated the definition of
the entrepreneur.  Reynolds (et.al. 2004) defines an entrepreneur as a person engaged
in some stage of firm formation.  In contrast, Baumol (1968) defines an entrepreneur
by his function, that is, the entrepreneur’s function is “to locate new ideas and to put
them into effect”(p. 65).  Still further, some scholars argue that an acceptance of the
risk inherent to starting a venture is central to defining entrepreneurship (e.g.,
Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979).  In this regard, Casson’s (1982) distilling of leading
theories results in defining an entrepreneur as one who bears risk to seek profit
through innovative activity.  Any study of entrepreneurship will likely be sensitive to
what definition is used to identify the entrepreneur. 
 Using labor market data to study this phenomenon adds another definition –
the entrepreneur as a self-employed individual.  There has been research on the
entrepreneurship decision, including Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and
Leighton (1989), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998),
Hamilton (2000), Fairlie (2002), and Lazear (2004, 2005).  These papers define the
entrepreneur as one who is self-employed.  Aldrich (1990), in particular, criticizes this
16
approach, arguing instead that entrepreneurship generally is a dynamic decision, with
individuals alternating between paid and self-employment (Aldrich 1990).  This
criticism is based on the view that understanding entrepreneurship requires study of
the process of firm formation and that anyone can choose to become an entrepreneur
given the right circumstances (Venkataraman 1998).
Using self-employment as the definition of entrepreneurship likely biases
estimates of who chooses to be an entrepreneur in policy-relevant ways. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), for instance, find that women are less likely to be
self-employed than men.  Similarly, Lazear (2005) finds that males are more likely to
be self-employed.  However, any conclusions about women's entrepreneurship based
on studies of the self-employed may be unreliable if entrepreneurs are a larger group
than individuals who are self-employed.
Another potential selection issue arising from the self-employment definition
of entrepreneurship is that conclusions about the skills and experiences of potential
entrepreneurs may be incorrect.  For example, Lazear (2004) defines entrepreneurship
as incorporated self-employment.  Using this definition in an analysis of a sample of
Stanford MBA graduates, he concludes “It is executives and other administrative
personnel who form the bulk of entrepreneurs, and they are found primarily in
construction, retail trade, and professional services”(p. 210).  Lazear (2004) may be
mistaken in this conclusion, since his definition suffers from two potential selection
issues – incorporation and self-employment.  First, Lazear’s (2004) results about
entrepreneurship are based on self-employment.  Then, the results about the self-
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employed are further biased towards those that have incorporated.  This means that
Lazear’s (2004) results are biased toward the most successful entrepreneurs – the
successfully incorporated self-employed – since the self-employed are themselves
successful nascent entrepreneurs. 
Finally, several papers conclude that liquidity constraints are binding to
entrepreneurs (Evans & Jovanovic 1989; Evans & Leighton 1989; Holtz-Eakin, et al.
1994a & 1994b; Blanchflower & Oswald 1998).  These studies – all of which use
some measure of wealth to measure liquidity – come to this conclusion by studying
the self-employed as the exclusive definition of the entrepreneur.  However, the
selection bias due to the use of self-employment means that the wealth effects may be
overestimated.
Shifting away from the definition of entrepreneurship as self-employment, this
study of an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur has much to offer.  The
research on the decision to become an entrepreneur has been referred, somewhat
derogatorily, as “traits” research (Aldrich 1990).  A shortcoming of this approach is
that some of the past “traits” research has relied on very small samples (e.g., Reynolds
1997).  While Venkataraman (1998) argues that the best way to study
entrepreneurship is to study the dynamics of firm formation, it has added little to the
understanding of the supply of entrepreneurs, which itself has been a point of
contention among entrepreneurship researchers (Burke, et al. 2006).  
To address the shortcomings in this line of research, I develop a theoretical
model of the decision to become an entrepreneur extending Lazear’s (2005) model of
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the entrepreneurship decision.  This theoretical model has the advantage of being able
to explain why individuals choose to become entrepreneurs even when the income
from doing so is lower than they would receive from paid employment.  This result
has been found by Hamilton (2000), but is not accounted for in Lazear’s model.  In
order to test the theoretical model, this chapter estimates the probability that an
individual chooses to become an entrepreneur using data from the Panel Survey of
Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) which focuses on nascent entrepreneurs – defined
by whether they plan to start a business, not whether they are self-employed.
The PSED was developed by a consortium of researchers interested in
developing a dataset focused on the dynamics of firm formation (Gartner, et al 2004). 
The PSED follows a group of 830 nascent entrepreneurs over four waves along with a
control group of 431 individuals.  The difference between nascent entrepreneurs and
the self-employed is that a self-employed individual operates a firm which was being
planned when that individual was a nascent entrepreneur.  In a sense, a self-employed
individual is a successful nascent entrepreneur since the goal of nascent
entrepreneurship is to create an operating firm.  This difference between nascent
entrepreneurs and the self-employed is illustrated in Figure 1.  Some entrepreneurship
researchers believe the identifiable difference between nascent entrepreneurs and the
self-employed means a gap exists in the information about firm formation.  The PSED
is intended to fill this gap.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the entrepreneurial decision in
three ways.  First, it develops a utility-based model of the decision to become an 
19
Figure 1. The Entrepreneurship Process
entrepreneur.  Second, this model is analyzed by using an entrepreneurship-focused
dataset.  Third, several subsamples are created from this dataset based on competing
definitions of entrepreneurship – self-employment or nascent entrepreneurship – and
models of these subsamples are compared.
This chapter finds significant differences between the self-employed and
nascent entrepreneurs.  However, these differences can be explained by the
observation that self-employment is the objective of the nascent entrepreneur.  The
existence of differences between the self-employed and nascent entrepreneurs is
evidence that selection bias results from using self-employment as the exclusive
definition of entrepreneurship. The chapter proceeds with a description of the relevant
theory in section two, a detailed description of the data in section three, presentation
and interpretation of the empirical results in section four, and discussion of the
conclusions in section five.
Theory
20
Knight (1921) is among the foundational papers in entrepreneurship research,
particularly with regard to the analysis of entrepreneurs.  By tying the risk-bearing of
potential entrepreneurs to the decision they make to enter the market for
entrepreneurs, he makes possible the identification of the supply of entrepreneurs. 
The supply of entrepreneurs has since been the basis for examinations of the decision
to become an entrepreneur.
Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), in particular, build on the risk-bearing function
of entrepreneurs to formulate a general equilibrium model of entrepreneurial choice
based on income differentials.  Their model assumes that all potential entrepreneurs
are risk averse to build a model of the supply of the self-employed under uncertainty. 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) alter this model by assuming instead that all
entrepreneurs are risk neutral, which guarantees that the self-employment decision is a
simple comparison of expected incomes.  They estimate several models of self-
employment using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLS). 
The Evans and Jovanovic (1989) risk neutral model is then used by Evans and
Leighton (1989) to estimate separate earnings models of self-employment and wage
work using both the NLS and the Current Population Survey (CPS).
Holtz-Eakin, et al. (1994b) confirm previous results that liquidity constraints
bind on the self-employment decision by studying the impact of inheritances using
data from U.S. federal income tax returns.  Lindh and Olhsson (1996) model the
effect of “windfall” gains such as lottery winnings to the self-employment decision. 
Both papers find further support for the theory that liquidity constraints are binding to
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the self-employment decision.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) add psychological
measures to empirical models of self-employment.  Their results add to the
confirmation of the importance of liquidity constraints to being self-employed.
Lazear (2004, 2005) builds, in part, on Kihlstrom’s and Laffont’s (1979)
general equilibrium model.  Lazear presents the entrepreneurial decision as a choice
between a less risky paid income and a more risky entrepreneurial one.  Lazear
discounts the entrepreneurial choice to reflect the potential non-pecuniary benefits to
being self-employed.  The difference in outcomes is important given the results of
Hamilton (2000), who demonstrates that the self-employed enter and remain in
business despite the fact they have lower initial earnings and experience lower
earnings growth than if they worked for others.  Lazear (2005) discounts the potential
entrepreneur’s income to account for the market value of entrepreneurial activity – in
essence, the discount is meant to equate the supply and demand of entrepreneurs
accounting for the fact that entrepreneurs must have a number of skills to run a
business.  Under this model, an individual chooses to become an entrepreneur if his
income from being an entrepreneur is greater than his discounted income from
working for others.
Frey and Benz (2003) and Benz and Frey (2003) note that the self-employed in
developed countries are much happier than their counterparts working for others, a
result also found by Blanchflower and Oswald (1998).  That the self-employed are
more content in their work than the employed indicates that an important
consideration in the entrepreneurial decision may not be income related.  The
 An example is the homebrewing entrepreneur that has no local access, beyond the Internet, to1
homebrewing supplies.  If this entrepreneur has enough friends with the same need, she might find
opening a homebrew supply store advantageous even if it means lower income than working for others. 
See Tregear (2005) for more examples of so-called “lifestyle” entrepreneurs.
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preferences for autonomy or other non-income factors, such as filling some otherwise
unfilled personal demand of the entrepreneur,  do not fit well with Lazear’s (2005)1
model but are clearly demonstrated in these papers.  As a response to the incongruity
between income-based models and utility-based reasons for an individual’s decision
to be an entrepreneur, Benz (2005) modifies Lazear’s (2005) model to be a
comparison of discounted utility, rather than income states.  Benz (2005) adjusts the
Lazear (2005) model by adding a term to the discount value to account for non-
monetary benefits to the entrepreneur.  The addition of a non-monetary utility for
gains from being an entrepreneur thus reduces the threshold for choosing
entrepreneurship.
In the Benz (2005) model, an entrepreneur chooses to become self-employed
if his income from entrepreneurship exceeds the income from working for others
discounted to account both for Lazear’s (2004, 2005) measures for skill differences
and for the entrepreneur’s preference for autonomy.  Therefore, the resulting Benz
(2005) model allows for entrepreneurs choosing to enter markets even when doing so
will result in less income.  Unfortunately, though, this model still requires a
comparison of incomes between states even though income data in both states may
not be available.
This chapter modifies the Benz (2005) model to account for the lack of
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income data in both states.  Since we cannot measure either the potential
entrepreneurial income of non-entrepreneurs or the non-entrepreneurial income of
entrepreneurs, we need a different way to compare states in a way that still accounts
for the possibility that the entrepreneur’s decision is based on income and non-income
reasons.  The method developed in this chapter to model an entrepreneur’s decision
using both income and non-income reasons is the random utility model.
The following discussion follows Hanemann (1984) except that it replaces the
willingness-to-accept (WTA) measure used in the original paper with a similarly
defined measure for the willingness to become an entrepreneur.  An individual with
utility function with states j, state-dependent income , and vector of
individual control variables s, chooses entrepreneurial activity if
(1)
In the case of the above equation, state 1 is the entrepreneurial state.  Individuals with
greater preferences for entrepreneurial characteristics – e.g., greater autonomy and
internal locus of control – are more likely to choose state 1 over state 0 since they
value the non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship more highly.
Each individual assigns some value to the entrepreneurial characteristics and
compares the value of these characteristics to the pecuniary costs of entrepreneurship
measured, in part, by the difference between entrepreneurial income and the income
from paid work.  Individuals who stand to earn more as entrepreneurs will certainly
choose to become entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by Lazear’s (2004, 2005) model.  In
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the random utility model of entrepreneurial choice, however, the individual who may
earn less as an entrepreneur than in paid work, but has a higher value for
entrepreneurial characteristics, will choose to become and entrepreneur so long as this
individual’s preferences for entrepreneurial characteristics exceeds the difference in
income between states.  In Lazear’s (2004, 2005) model, this type of individual is
expected to always choose to remain in paid work.
The counterfactual income for both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is not
observed in either Lazear’s model or random utility model.  The lack of
counterfactual income is not a problem in the random utility model of entrepreneurial
choice since the decision to become an entrepreneur is not based solely on the
comparison between incomes in each state.  However, the lack of counterfactual
income in the Lazear (2004, 2005) model is a significant problem since his model of
entrepreneurial choice is based entirely on the basis of income comparison.  In fact,
the Lazear (2004, 2005) model actually assumes that entrepreneurs always have
higher incomes as entrepreneurs than as paid workers, even though Hamilton (2000)
has demonstrated that the self-employed earn less on average than paid workers.  The
random utility model of entrepreneurial choice makes no such assumption about
income differences between the entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial states.
Equation 1 models the difference in utility measures, which cannot be




where  is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean.  Equation 2 means the same as
saying an individual becomes an entrepreneur if the following condition holds:
. (3)
Since the individual knows which state, entrepreneur or employed work, maximizes
her utility, the trouble with signing the derivative of the utility function with respect to
state for non-entrepreneurs becomes trivial.  Additionally, knowing that an individual
will always choose entrepreneurship when equation 3 is true allows the estimation of
a model with probabilities defined as follows:
. (4)
It should be noted that the counterfactual income is not available for either the
entrepreneur or the non-entrepreneur.  However, this does not affect the conclusions
of the random utility model.  Since only the utility difference matters to the choice of
entrepreneurship, any individual that chooses to be an entrepreneur will have higher
utility in this state regardless of income.  In short, if an individual entrepreneur’s
entrepreneurial income is not higher, the income lost to the entrepreneurial venture is
compensated by the non-pecuniary benefits of being an entrepreneur.  The opposite is
true for any non-entrepreneur.  Thus, the counterfactual income is not an issue for the
random utility model.
The random utility model employed in this chapter will compare entrepreneurs
with non-entrepreneurs using a model based on the existence of the utility difference
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between these states.  An individual chooses the entrepreneur state if that individual’s
utility from entrepreneurship is higher than the utility from paid work.  
Data
This chapter uses data from the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
(PSED) to evaluate the entrepreneurship decision.  Gartner, et al. (2004) explain that
the PSED was developed in response to the need for data that better identify
entrepreneurs at earlier stages of their activity.  The dataset contains responses from
1,261 respondents – 830 identified entrepreneurs and 431 non-entrepreneurs in the
control group.  Previously, researchers had to identify entrepreneurs by using
self-employed individuals in various datasets, such as the National Longitudinal
Survey or the Current Population Survey, or from surveying existing business owners
about their recollections of the early days of their ventures.  The restrictions of
existing data to defining entrepreneurs only as individuals who are self-employed had
two consequences.
The first consequence, due to the limitation of the data to those self-employed,
is that researchers were investigating the issues of self-employment and not
entrepreneurship.  Although the difference seems trivial, it does mean that the only
entrepreneurs in the data were those that had successfully created firms, and thus
became self-employed.  The result is positive selection bias to self-employment in
that those who planned to setup firms but were still planning when the data were
collected were not included as entrepreneurs, even though they may have in fact been
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actively engaged in entrepreneurial activities.
The second consequence results from using the recollections of the
well-established business owner.  The use of firm owners’ recollections means that
the results are biased toward the self-employed and that the data rely heavily on the
accuracy of the entrepreneurs' memories.  This bias means that research based on this
definition of entrepreneur does not include information about uncreated, but planned,
firms.
The PSED solves both of these problems by identifying entrepreneurs
according to the respondent's answers to two questions (Reynolds, et al. 2004).  The
first of these questions is, "Are you, alone or with others, now trying to start a
business?"  The second is, “Are you, alone or with others, now starting a new
business or new venture for your employer?"  If the respondent answers "Yes" to
either of these questions, the respondent is considered a nascent entrepreneur.  If the
respondent answers affirmatively only to the first, the respondent is considered simply
a nascent entrepreneur.  If affirmative only to the second, the respondent is considered
a nascent corporate entrepreneur.  Here, the nascent entrepreneur is identified by
whether the respondent answers "Yes" to at least the first question.
The PSED follows the entrepreneur group over four waves.  Unfortunately,
panel data is unavailable for the control group, which includes individuals who were
not involved in some stage of creating a new business during the first wave of the
survey, because the PSED research consortium dropped this group in the subsequent
waves.  Therefore, only the first wave is used in this chapter.
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Table 1 is an overview of the number of respondents classified by each
entrepreneurship definition.  The column of Table 1 labeled “Total PSED” reports the
numbers of respondents by entrepreneurship definition for the entire PSED.  The
PSED defines an entrepreneur according to the nascent entrepreneur definition
discussed earlier in this section.  However, past studies, such as Hamilton (2000),
identify the self-employed as entrepreneurs.  For this reason, self-employed
respondents are noted as a distinct category from nascent entrepreneurs.  A separate
model of entrepreneurship is estimated for the self-employed, as well.  A final
definition of the entrepreneur is the corporate nascent entrepreneur also discussed
earlier in this section.  These entrepreneurs are nascent entrepreneurs that are planning
ventures with a current employer.  Since they are identified as a distinct subcategory
of nascent entrepreneurs, they are noted in Table 1 and separate models of corporate
nascent entrepreneurship are estimated as well.
The two rows below the label “Self-employed Samples” report the counts for
the alternatives of the self-employed definition of entrepreneur.  These samples sum
to the total number of respondents since some nascent entrepreneurs are also self-
employed while some nascent entrepreneurs are not self-employed.  Some
respondents in the control group may also be self-employed.
The rows below the label “Nascent Entrepreneur Sub-samples” report the
number of respondents for each sub-sample of nascent entrepreneur.  Each pair of
rows in this category sum to the total number of nascent entrepreneurs, or 830 in the
case of the complete PSED.
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Table 1. Samples From Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
Total PSED Full Model Sample
Total Number of Respondents 1,261 1,167
Nascent Entrepreneur 830 751
Control (Not Nascent Entrepreneurs) 431 416
Self-employed Samples 1,261 1,167
Self-employed (Both Nascent Entrepreneurs and Control) 555 513
Not Self-employed (Both Nascent Entrepreneurs and Control) 706 654
Nascent Entrepreneur Sub-samples 830 751
Nascent Entrepreneur and Self-employed 457 418
Nascent Entrepreneur and not Self-employed 373 333
Corporate Nascent Entrepreneur 118 107
Nascent Entrepreneur and not a Corporate Nascent
Entrepreneur
712 644
Nascent Entrepreneur and either Self-employed or Corporate 513 467
Nascent Entrepreneur and neither Self-employed nor Corporate 317 284
Control Group Sub-samples 431 416
Self-employed and not a Nascent Entrepreneur 98 95
Neither Self-Employed nor a Nascent Entrepreneur 333 321
The rows below the label “Control Group Sub-samples” report the number of
respondents in each category in the control group.  These rows sum to the total
number in the control group, or 431 in the complete PSED.  The last row of Table 1
gives the number of non-entrepreneurs using both major definitions, self-employed or
planning a new business.  In the PSED, 333 respondents are neither self-employed nor
a nascent entrepreneur.
The column labeled “Full Model” reports the sample used in the analysis,
which is the sample that results when missing values are removed for the regressors in
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the model with all variables included.  Table 2 gives a list of these regressors and
their definitions.  The “Full Model” sample noted in Table 1 has a total of 1,167
respondents, 751 of which are nascent entrepreneurs and 416 are in the control group. 
The rows of this column follow a similar description as the explanation given above
for the “Total PSED” column.
Table 3 reviews the sample sizes and other summary statistics for the
regressors used in the analysis.  The statistics reported in this table are for the
complete PSED when no respondents have been removed.  Of particular note in Table
3 are the number of non-missing observations for each regressor.  As shown in this
column, net worth is the regressor which results in the largest individual number of
lost observations.  Half of the 94 respondents removed for any reason are removed for
missing values of net worth.   The remaining 47 respondents are removed from the
total sample for age, born in the U.S., number of children, education, years of work
experience, and years living in
current county, employment status, and home ownership.  The resulting dataset is the
“Full Model” sample of 1,167 respondents described in Table 1.  The summary
statistics for each regressor from the “Full Model” sample is reported in Table 4.
Table 5 reports the mean and standard deviation for each regressor by
entrepreneurship definition – self-employed, nascent entrepreneur, and corporate
nascent entrepreneur – from the “Full Model” sample.
Several county-level measures are taken from other sources.  Each of these
measures are included to control for the potential effects of county economic
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Table 2. Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Name Definition
Female Female = 1
Nonwhite Nonwhite = 1
Age Age at time of survey
Born in the U.S. Born in the U.S. = 1
Education Years of education
Married Married = 1
Number of children Number of children under age 18
Parent was Self-employed At least one parent of respondent was self-employed = 1
Friend Owns Business At least one friend of respondent owns a business = 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. Has positive impression of the self-employed = 1
Positive Economic Outlook Has positive economic outlook = 1
Years of Work Experience Total Years of Work Experience
Years Living in Current County Years Living in Current County
Prefers Doing Things “Better” Prefers doing things “better” = 1
Unemployed Unemployed = 1
Retired Retired = 1
Net Worth Net Worth ($10,000)
Homeowner Homeowner = 1
Regional Business Ownership Regional proportion of non-farm proprietors to number of households
Regional Population Density Regional population density (1,000/square mile)
Regional Per Capita Income Regional per capita total personal income ($1,000)
Regional Income Distribution Regional percentage of households with income $75K or more
Regional Age Distribution Regional percentage of population ages 25-44
Regional Education Level Regional percentage of population age 25 or older with college degree
Regional Population Growth Annualized percentage change in regional population
Regional Unemployment Regional unemployment rate
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Table 3. Summary Statistics, Total PSED
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 1,261 0.509 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite 1,261 0.443 0.497 0 1
Age 1,258 39.893 12.18 18 93
Born in the U.S. 1,230 0.915 0.278 0 1
Education 1,257 14.866 2.623 8 20
Married 1,261 0.549 0.498 0 1
Number of Children 1,250 1.13 1.314 0 7
Parent was Self-employed 1,261 0.47 0.499 0 1
Friend Owns Business 1,261 0.698 0.459 0 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. 1,261 0.8 0.4 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook 1,261 0.49 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience 1,242 17.08 11.105 0 60
Years Living in Current County 1,236 18.31 15.477 0.011 93
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 1,261 0.712 0.453 0 1
Unemployed 1,260 0.132 0.338 0 1
Retired 1,260 0.054 0.226 0 1
Net Worth ($10,000) 1,214 25.189 39.418 -38 260
Homeowner 1,257 0.656 0.475 0 1
Regional Business Ownership 1,261 0.213 0.06 0.07 0.6
Regional Population Density 1,261 2.426 7.065 0.001 53.181
Regional Per Capita Income 1,261 20.305 6.824 2.185 52.498
Regional Income Distribution 1,261 9.306 5.56 0.876 33.345
Regional Age Distribution 1,261 32.718 3.219 21.1 49.1
Regional Education Level 1,261 20.712 7.817 4.795 52.299
Regional Population Growth 1,261 1.342 1.814 -2.041 11.827
Regional Unemployment 1,261 4.395 1.927 1.1 23.6
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Table 4. Summary Statistics, Full Model Sample
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 1,167 0.51 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite 1,167 0.436 0.496 0 1
Age 1,167 39.922 12.165 18 93
Born in the U.S. 1,167 0.928 0.259 0 1
Education 1,167 14.877 2.597 8 20
Married 1,167 0.556 0.497 0 1
Number of Children 1,167 1.141 1.318 0 7
Parent was Self-employed 1,167 0.47 0.499 0 1
Friend Owns Business 1,167 0.706 0.456 0 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. 1,167 0.8 0.4 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook 1,167 0.494 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience 1,167 17.015 11.086 0 60
Years Living in Current County 1,167 18.360 15.48 0.011 93
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 1,167 0.721 0.449 0 1
Unemployed 1,167 0.129 0.336 0 1
Retired 1,167 0.055 0.228 0 1
Net Worth ($10,000) 1,167 25.228 39.601 -38 260
Homeowner 1,167 0.658 0.475 0 1
Regional Business Ownership 1,167 0.213 0.061 0.07 0.6
Regional Population Density 1,167 2.296 6.68 0.001 53.181
Regional Per Capita Income 1,167 20.3 6.657 2.185 52.498
Regional Income Distribution 1,167 9.256 5.566 0.876 33.345
Regional Age Distribution 1,167 32.683 3.228 21.1 49.1
Regional Education Level 1,167 20.676 7.83 4.795 52.299
Regional Population Growth 1,167 1.352 1.835 -2.041 11.827
Regional Unemployment 1,167 4.394 1.935 1.1 23.6
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Female 0.466 0.499 0.485 0.5 0.336 0.475
Nonwhite 0.365 0.482 0.368 0.482 0.523 0.502
Age 41.207 11.922 39.63 11.103 35.72 9.725
Born in the U.S. 0.932 0.252 0.936 0.245 0.888 0.317
Education 14.945 2.676 15.085 2.55 14.374 2.486
Married 0.583 0.494 0.574 0.495 0.458 0.501
Number of children 1.146 1.32 1.125 1.317 1.252 1.304
Parent was Self-employed 0.526 0.5 0.502 0.5 0.458 0.501
Friend Owns Business 0.735 0.442 0.743 0.437 0.720 0.451
Positive Impression of Self-employment 0.854 0.354 0.846 0.362 0.85 0.358
Positive Economic Outlook 0.507 0.5 0.518 0.5 0.514 0.502
Years of Work Experience 18.661 11.531 17.369 10.64 14.794 9.192
Years Living in Current County 18.959 15.62 17.405 14.421 16.397 13.254
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 0.694 0.461 0.679 0.467 0.729 0.447
Unemployed 0.129 0.335 0.119 0.323 0.103 0.305
Retired 0.051 0.22 0.031 0.172 0.009 0.097
Net Worth ($10,000) 26.97 44.798 25.301 41.067 25.311 43.293
Homeowner 0.694 0.461 0.672 0.47 0.551 0.5
Regional Business Ownership 0.219 0.061 0.218 0.061 0.215 0.065
Regional Population Density 1.878 5.791 2.114 6.35 2.367 5.207
Regional Per Capita Income 20.165 6.534 20.354 6.598 20.18 6.762
Regional Income Distribution 9.262 5.518 9.314 5.404 10.033 5.743
Regional Age Distribution 32.735 3.365 32.784 3.247 33.033 3.312
Regional Education Level 20.561 7.844 21.013 7.844 22.056 7.957
Regional Population Growth 1.392 1.845 1.372 1.74 1.282 1.647
Regional Unemployment 4.38 1.879 4.387 1.874 4.273 1.773
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conditions on the probability an individual chooses to become an entrepreneur.  The
PSED includes Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) identifiers at the
state and county level for each respondent.  Additionally, the PSED reports a number
of county-level economic and demographic data for each respondent, obtained from
either the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) of the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis or the U.S. Census Bureau’s City and County Data Book (CCDB)
(Reynolds 2004).  County-level regressors in this analysis that are directly taken from
the PSED are the percentage of non-farm proprietorship, population density, per-
capita income, income distribution, education, and population growth.  One additional
county-level measure is constructed separately and added to the sample by matching
state and county FIPS codes.  This measure is the county-level unemployment rate,
which is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The unemployment
rates are matched to the respondent based on the year the respondent completed the
phone survey.
Empirical Results
The analysis begins by estimating a model of self-employment since previous
empirical research has defined entrepreneurship in this way.  Two other definitions of
entrepreneurship – nascent entrepreneurship and corporate nascent entrepreneurship –
are then tested in separate models using the same specification as the model of self-
employment.  These definitions of entrepreneurship and the number of respondents
identified within each definition are reported in Table 1.
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The probability that respondent  chooses to be an entrepreneur is estimated
using the following model:
(5)
Results of probit models of each definition of entrepreneurship, with robust standard
errors and marginal effects, are reported in Tables 6 through 8.
In all of the models, a specification without the net worth measures – net
worth and its square – is estimated.  The potential for endogeneity of net worth in
these models makes this specification necessary.  This endogeneity is potentially a
problem in the self-employment model, since the net worth of the self-employed
respondent is clearly related to that respondent’s self-employed status.  However, net
worth is possibly not endogenous to either of the nascent entrepreneur models since
the nascent entrepreneur’s status may not directly impact the nascent entrepreneur’s
net worth, since the firm may not produce any wealth to the nascent entrepreneur at
the time of the survey.  However, this relationship is not guaranteed to either exist or
not exist, so specifications with and without net worth are reported.
Factors Associated with Self-Employment
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Models of self-employment are reported in Table 6.  The model in the first
column of results (“Full Model”) includes all regressors and types of respondent. 
Column 2 (“without Net Worth”) reports a model using all respondents in the sample,
but has removed the regressors for net worth and its square.  The third and final
column is a model with all regressors but uses a sample with the nascent
entrepreneurs removed.  This final model is, then, a comparison between the self-
employed and the paid employees within the control group.
The only demographic variable positively associated with being self-employed
are having parents that were self-employed.  Having a friend that owns a business is
insignificant to the probability of being self-employed.  Nonwhites and women are
less likely to become self-employed, unless nascent entrepreneurs are removed from
the sample.  The remaining individual demographic variables – age, education,
marital status, number of children, and U.S.-born status – are statistically
insignificant.
Two personality variables are found to have an effect on self-employment. 
Having a positive impression of the self-employed increases the probability that an
individual is self-employed, while the preference for doing things “better” reduces the
probability one becomes self-employed.  The a priori expectation is that
entrepreneurs would prefer doing things “better” as a consequence of their desire for
autonomy.  However, the flexibility a successful nascent entrepreneur – a self-
employed person – needs to run a business may influence this result.
Years of work experience increases the probability an individual is self-
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Table 6. Probit Models of the Self-Employed



















































































































Table 6. Probit Models of the Self-Employed, continued




















































Observations 1,167 1,195 416
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
employed, unless nascent entrepreneurs are removed.  However, local residency has
no statistically significant effect.  Being unemployed and being retired are both
insignificant across specifications.
An individual’s net worth has a negative and non-linear, but marginally
significant, relationship to the probability an individual is self-employed.  However,
there is the potential for endogeneity of these variables to this specification.  Owning
a home is insignificant to the probability of self-employment.
The only regional measure that is found to have a significant effect on self-
employment is the age distribution of the county in which the respondent resides.  The
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more youthful the county in which the respondent resides, the more likely that
individual is self-employed.  However, the significance of this coefficient drops away
when nascent entrepreneurs are removed from the sample.
Factors Associated with Nascent Entrepreneurship
Five specifications of the model of the nascent entrepreneurship are reported
in Table 7.  The first is again a “Full Model” specification using the full sample and
all regressors.  The second specification uses the full sample but drops the regressors
for net worth and its square.  The remaining specifications use all regressors.  The
third specification uses a sample where the self-employed respondents have been
removed.  The fourth specification uses a sample without corporate nascent
entrepreneurs.  The fifth, and final, specification uses a sample without either self-
employed or corporate nascent entrepreneurs.
Two demographic variables are generally significant to the probability of
being a nascent entrepreneur.  These are race and having a friend who owns a
business.  Nonwhites are approximately 16% less likely to choose nascent
entrepreneurship than whites.  Having a friend that owns a business increases the
probability an individual chooses to be a nascent entrepreneur.  However, when the
self-employed and corporate nascent entrepreneurs are removed from the sample, the
coefficient on this variable is no longer significant.  Also, when the self-employed are
removed from the sample, the coefficient on this variable is only marginally
significant.
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Table 7. Probit Models of Nascent Entrepreneurs



































































































































































































Table 7. Probit Models of Nascent Entrepreneurs, continued














































































































Observations 1,167 1,195 654 1,060 605
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All three personality regressors are significant to the probability of being a
nascent entrepreneur.  Having a positive impression of self-employment increases the
probability an individual is a nascent entrepreneur by around 20% in all
specifications.  Having a positive economic outlook is positively related to being a
nascent entrepreneur, unless the self-employed are removed from the sample. 
However, preferring to do things “better” reduces the probability an individual is a
nascent entrepreneur by at least 14%.
Two employment experience regressors are found to have a significant effect
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on the probability of being a nascent entrepreneur.  First, the years of work experience
increases the probability an individual is a nascent entrepreneur by about one-half
percent per year of experience.  Second, being retired reduces the probability an
individual chooses to be a nascent entrepreneur by around 25%.  Neither the length of
residence nor being unemployed are found to be significant to the model of nascent
entrepreneurship.
Financial variables are found to be marginally significant to being a nascent
entrepreneur.  Net worth is marginally significant in two specifications where it is
included, the full sample and the sample without the self-employed.  In both cases,
higher net worth reduces the probability an individual is a nascent entrepreneur. 
However, the squared net worth term is not significant in any specification.  Owning a
home has is also not statistically significant in any specification.
Three regional regressors are found to have at least some degree of
significance to the probability an individual is a nascent entrepreneur.  The local
education level increases the probability an individual is a nascent entrepreneur by
over one-half percent for each percentage increase in the number of college-educated
individuals in the county.  The county unemployment rate is positively related to the
probability of nascent entrepreneurship as well, although this coefficient is
insignificant in specifications without the self-employed.  Finally, the county
population growth rate is marginally significant and negative in specifications using
the full sample.
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Factors Affecting Corporate Nascent Entrepreneurs
In order to determine whether corporate nascent entrepreneurs – who are
starting firms with a recent employer – are different from other nascent entrepreneurs,
a separate model is run for this entrepreneurship definition.  Three specifications for
the model of corporate nascent entrepreneurship are reported in Table 8.  Following
the other models, the first specification includes all regressors and the full sample. 
The second specification uses the full sample, but drops the regressors for net worth. 
Finally, the third specification uses the full set of regressors, but drops the control
group from the analysis.  This last specification is, then, a model of the difference
between being a corporate nascent entrepreneur and being a non-corporate nascent
entrepreneur.
Only one demographic regressor is consistently found to have an effect on the
probability of corporate nascent entrepreneurship.  Women are at least five percent
less likely to be corporate nascent entrepreneurs.  When the control group is removed,
nonwhites are five percent more likely to be corporate nascent entrepreneurs than
non-corporate nascent entrepreneurs, while having more children increases the
probability of corporate nascent entrepreneurship.  Being older reduces the probability
of corporate nascent entrepreneurship, unless the control group is removed. 
Education reduces the probability as well, unless net worth is removed.
No personality variable is consistently significant to corporate nascent
entrepreneurship.  Having a positive impression of self-employment increases the
probability of being a corporate nascent entrepreneur by almost three percent, but is
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Table 8. Probit Models of Corporate Entrepreneurs



















































































































Table 8. Probit Models of Corporate Entrepreneurs, continued




















































Observations 1,167 1,195 751
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
only marginally significant when the full sample is used and is insignificant when the
control group is removed.  Preferring to do things “better” is only significant when the
control group is removed.  Nascent entrepreneurs with this preference are 4.5% more
likely to be corporate nascent entrepreneurs.
Of the experience regressors, only being retired is significant to the probability
of being a corporate nascent entrepreneur.  Being retired reduces the probability by six
percent in the full model and by a marginally significant eight percent without the
control group.  It should be noted that all corporate nascent entrepreneurs are not
retired by construction of the PSED.
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No remaining regressors are found to have a significant effect on the
probability of being a corporate nascent entrepreneur.  Net worth and its square are
consistently insignificant across specifications where they are included.  Owning a
home is also insignificant in all specifications.  No regional measure is found to have
a statistically significant impact on the probability of corporate nascent
entrepreneurship.
Are Self-Employed Individuals Different From Nascent Entrepreneurs?
The question of whether the self-employed are different from nascent
entrepreneurs is the question of whether past studies of the self-employed suffered
from selection bias.  Table 9 shows the results of a pair of Chow tests performed on
the data to address this question.  Both tests are of the nascent entrepreneur definition
against the alternative entrepreneurship definitions – self-employment and corporate
nascent entrepreneurship.  The tests are performed by using a linear probability model
of the nascent entrepreneur definition as defined by the Panel Survey of
Entrepreneurial Dynamics.  Table 9 reports the calculated F statistic for each
definition and the rejection level of the statistic.
Table 9. Chow Tests of Differences Between Nascent Entrepreneurs and Others
Entrepreneurship Hypothesis Calculated F Statistic Rejection Level
Nascent Entrepreneurship is equivalent to Self-employment 4.676 1%
General Nascent Entrepreneurship is equivalent to
Corporate Nascent Entrepreneurship
3.197 1%
5% critical F(27, 1139) = 1.66, 1% critical F(27, 1139) = 2.07
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The self-employed are found to be significantly different from nascent
entrepreneurs.  The null hypothesis that both definitions are identical is rejected at the
one percent level.  This supports the contentions of Aldrich (1990), Gartner, et al.
(2004), and Burke, et al. (2006) that these groups are different.  In other words,
selection bias is a problem of past research that examined only the self-employed in
their studies of entrepreneurship.
However, none of these authors connects the problems of using a self-
employment definition of entrepreneurship with potential selection bias.  In particular,
Aldrich (1990) and Gartner, et al. (2004) focus on several other problems in earlier
entrepreneurship research – such as small samples and the lack of multivariate
analysis.  These papers support the existence of selection bias due to defining
entrepreneurs solely as the self-employed, but they do not draw the same conclusions
about selection bias that have been found in this chapter.  In this respect, the problems
discussed by Aldrich (1990) and others are worse than have been previously
identified.
Second, corporate entrepreneurs are found to be different from other nascent
entrepreneurs, again at the one percent level.  This difference is expected at least in
terms of the differences between each group with regard to liquidity constraints. 
Corporate nascent entrepreneurs do not experience the same difficulties financing a
firm that other nascent entrepreneurs do, since corporate nascent entrepreneurs have
access to the resources of their employers.
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Conclusions
This chapter examines models of entrepreneurship with data from the Panel
Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED).  These models utilize different
definitions within the PSED, mostly based on either self-employment or nascent
entrepreneurship.  These various definitions are examined by estimating models with
samples adjusted for each separate definition.  For instance, the PSED allows the
currently self-employed to identify themselves as nascent entrepreneurs, by planning a
new venture while working in their current one.  Additionally, the PSED identifies
some respondents as corporate nascent entrepreneurs, who are planning new
businesses with a current employer.
There are several similarities between self-employment and nascent
entrepreneurship.  Nonwhites are less likely to be either self-employed or a nascent
entrepreneur.  Having a positive impression of self-employment increases both the
probability of being self-employed and the probability of being a nascent
entrepreneur, as does work experience.  Individuals who prefer doing things “better”
are less likely to be either self-employed or a nascent entrepreneur, as are individuals
with greater net worth.
Several differences exist between self-employment and nascent
entrepreneurship.  Women are less likely to be self-employed but are equally likely to
be nascent entrepreneurs.  Having a parent who was self-employed increases the
probability an individual is self-employed, but has no effect on the probability of
nascent entrepreneurship.  Interestingly, having a friend who owns a business has the
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opposite result, by increasing the probability of nascent entrepreneurship but having
no effect on self-employment.  Individuals with a positive economic outlook are more
likely to be nascent entrepreneurs, but a positive economic outlook does not change
the probability of being self-employed.  Retirees are less likely to be nascent
entrepreneurs but being retired has no effect on the probability of self-employment.
A Chow test performed on the hypothesis that the models of self-employment
are identical to models of nascent entrepreneurship confirms that the differences
outweigh the similarities.  The similarity between these models is rejected at the one
percent level.  This result confirms many of the criticisms that entrepreneurship
researchers such as Aldrich (1990), Gartner, et al. (2004), and Burke, et al. (2006)
have made that nascent entrepreneurs and the self-employed are different.
Finally, a model of corporate nascent entrepreneurs is run.  Corporate nascent
entrepreneurs differ from other nascent entrepreneurs in that corporate nascent
entrepreneurs are planning firms with an employer.  This model finds that very few
regressors are significant to the probability of corporate nascent entrepreneurship. 
Women, in particular, are less likely to be corporate nascent entrepreneurs even
though no gender difference is found in nascent entrepreneurship, generally. 
However, the generally lackluster results of this model may be a result of the small
number of corporate nascent entrepreneurs within the PSED.  Certainly, the potential
difference between corporate nascent entrepreneurs and other nascent entrepreneurs
warrants further scrutiny of this group.
The major contribution of this analysis is finding that a clear difference does
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exist between the self-employed and nascent entrepreneurs.  In fact, studies that use
only the self-employed as a measure of entrepreneurship are introducing selection bias
in their estimates.  The selection bias here is a clear result of the fact that the self-
employed are successful nascent entrepreneurs, since the goal of nascent
entrepreneurship is to become self-employed.  The consequence of this selection bias
is that past entrepreneurship studies have been based only on successful entrepreneurs
– the self-employed.  This point is made by Aldrich (1990) and verified in this
analysis.
The selection bias identified by this analysis has both policy and research
implications, most notably with regard to gender effects.  The policy implications are
due to the design of policies intended to overcome differences in overestimated
demographic variables such as gender.  The research implications are that further
examination of the firm formation process, particularly with regard to the relationship
between gender and firm establishment, needs to be conducted.
Policies which have been designed to increase the entrepreneurial activities of
women need to be redesigned.  The expectation that women are less likely to be
entrepreneurs has been based on the examination of self-employment.  Indeed, this
result has been confirmed in this chapter.  However, the overestimation of the effect
of gender on the probability that an individual chooses to be an entrepreneur, when
being an entrepreneur is defined as being self-employed, has also been demonstrated.
since gender is statistically insignificant in the model of the probability an individual
is a nascent entrepreneur.  Therefore, policies which as designed to increase the
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participation rate of women in entrepreneurial activities are misplaced, given that
there are no gender differences at the nascent entrepreneur stage.  Instead, these
policies should be targeted at women’s chances of establishing a firm (i.e., the
chances a woman becomes a successful nascent entrepreneur as is self-employed),
since the gender differences in self-employment persist.  Thus, policies that assist
women in establishing firms may narrow the gender gap in self-employment.
Finally, economists need to conduct further research into firm formation. 
Since women are no less likely to be nascent entrepreneurs, but are less likely to be
self-employed, there remain gender differences at some stage of the establishment of
firms.  These gender differences may be that women’s firms are less likely to be
established, possibly due to financing or other economic issues.  However, these
gender differences could also be due to women’s preferences for establishing firms in
ways that are not defined as self-employment (e.g., partnerships).  This analysis
demonstrates that selection bias underlying past studies of entrepreneurship based on




WHAT DETERMINES NASCENT ENTREPRENEUR OUTCOMES?
A DURATION ANALYSIS OF FIRM FORMATION
Nascent entrepreneurs are actively involved in starting a firm.  These
individuals are interesting and important in terms of the economy (Baumol, et al.
2007). However, not all nascent entrepreneurs are successful at starting firms.  In fact,
three potential outcomes have been noted for this group: remaining a nascent, starting
a firm, or quitting altogether (Carter, et al. 2003, Parker and Belghitar 2006).  The
Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) contains data on nascent
entrepreneurs and what occurs to them over additional three waves.  Parker and
Belghitar (2006) examine two of these three waves, choosing to remove data from the
final wave.  This is due to attrition from the data due nascents starting firms or
choosing to quit, both of which are the stated targets of their study.
This chapter, in contrast, analyzes the factors that are related to a nascent
entrepreneur quitting work on his firm or related to a nascent entrepreneur starting his
firm.  The data for this research comes from all three waves of the PSED.  Since data
consistency can be a problem for many panel models, this chapter develops a
framework for using a competing risks hazard model.  The hazard model has a
distinct advantage in cases where data attrition and censoring occurs, particularly
when that attrition is caused by the variables of interest.  Two hazard models, one of
the risks of a nascent entrepreneur quitting and one of the risks of a nascent
entrepreneur starting a firm, are estimated.
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This chapter finds that the nascent entrepreneur’s ability, access to resources,
and commitment to the firm formation process significantly affect the nascent
entrepreneur’s chances of getting a firm operational.  Only one measure, the self-
employment status of the nascent entrepreneur, has a negative and significant effect
on a nascent entrepreneur’s hazard of quitting – the result means that nascent
entrepreneurs that consider themselves self-employed are less likely to quit their
ventures.
A competing risks hazard model of the nascent entrepreneur’s possible
outcomes – firm operation or quitting – is developed in section two.  A discussion of
the PSED is provided in section three.  Empirical results are reported in section four.
Competing Risks Hazard Model of Firm Formation
The model developed in this section is a competing risks hazard model for
each of two possible decisions made by a nascent entrepreneur.  A nascent
entrepreneur is defined as an individual that is in the early stages of establishing a
firm (Gartner, et al. 2004).  The competing risks hazard model controls for the
attrition of individuals from the data.  This section begins by discussing a model by
Parker and Belghitar (2006) that uses the PSED data and the problems that paper had
in estimating the model because of attrition inherent in the PSED's structure.
Parker and Belghitar (2006) construct a model where a nascent entrepreneur is
confronted with a utility maximizing problem in the first of two periods.  The choice
made by the nascent entrepreneur in this period determines the utility outcome in this
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period and in the next.  In the first period, the nascent entrepreneur must decide
whether to remain a nascent entrepreneur or to quit trying to start a firm.  A third
possibility, that the venture becomes an operating firm, may occur in the first period. 
However, the operating firm reduces the problem for the nascent by removing the
necessity to choose.  These three options were defined by Parker and Belghitar (2006)
as
(6)
which they used to estimate a multinomial logit model.  However, one particular
problem of the PSED is that individuals drop out of the survey if they either choose to
end their attempts at firm formation or successfully create operating ventures.  The
result is that respondents identified as nascent entrepreneurs in the initial wave may
not show up in all three subsequent waves.  Parker and Belghitar (2006) chose to deal
with this problem by estimating a multinomial logit model only on individuals who
report in both the second and third waves, while completely ignoring the final fourth
wave.  This is a helpful, albeit unsatisfactory, method for dealing with missing data
points.
Instead, this chapter utilizes a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the
probability an individual PSED respondent chooses to quit being a nascent
entrepreneur.  The Cox proportional hazard model estimates the probability an event
occurs to an individual given that individual was engaged in activity that could lead to
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that event (Cox 1972).  In this chapter, the two separate events are whether a nascent
decides to quit trying to start a firm and whether a nascent is successful in starting a
firm.  In the data, each event is a distinct reason for a respondent to drop out of the
survey so each reason is modeled separately.
Models are estimated for a nascent successfully starting an operating firm and
for a nascent who quits the process.  The Cox proportional hazard models for each of
these possibilities are competing risks models – that is, the probability of operating a
firm is estimated given both that the respondent is actually a nascent and that they
have not exited the data for some other reason.  The competing risks hazard model for
an event j among possible events Z occurring at time t to individual i is estimated
according to a hazard function such as the following:
(7)
(Allison 1990, 186).  Following Parker and Belghitar (2006), J = 2 since two possible
outcomes lead to a nascent entrepreneur leaving the data – operating a firm and
quitting as a nascent entrepreneur.  In terms of conditioning variables, detailed in
Table 10, the model estimated here is the following:
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(8)
For this chapter, two possible events exist – operating a business or quitting
the effort to start a firm.  These two competing risks describe the possible means by
which a nascent entrepreneur leaves these data.  Each of these models is estimated
separately, however the nature of the competing risks model is such that estimating
separately is statistically the same as estimating them simultaneously (Allison 1990,
187-188).  The models adjust for a number of measures that can influence the
likelihood of an individual’s success or failure.
For instance, consider the case of an increase in the nascent’s wealth.  This
increase will change the nascent entrepreneur’s perceived likelihood of success in
forming his firm or the amount of resources he can invest in firm formation (Evans
and Jovanovic 1989, Evans and Leighton 1989, Holtz-Eakin, et al. 1994a, Holtz-
Eakin, et al. 1994b, Blanchflower and Oswald 1998).  When this perception changes,
the nascent will update his estimation of his probability of success, since wealth has
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changed.  The resulting probability will be higher than before, so the nascent will be
more likely to choose to either stay a nascent and less likely to choose to quit.  In the
case of a change in wealth, the wealth effect on the utility function does not impact
the subjective determination of the probability of success.  Except for income, any
other considerations will alter the choice of whether to remain a nascent through the
subjective determination of that probability in the same manner.  Examples of these
considerations are education, participation in a business assistance program, and
experience.
Now instead consider an increase in the nascent’s potential income from
employed work.  In this case, the effect of a higher income on utility makes a great
difference to the nascent’s subjective probability determination.  If the higher income
causes the nascent’s utility calculation to remain such that remaining a nascent is
better than being employed, then the subjective probability of success estimate will
not necessarily change.  If, however, the nascent now perceives the utility difference
between remaining a nascent and quitting for employed work to be in favor of
working for others, the subjective probability of the potential firm formation will
change in such as way that the nascent will quit trying to form a firm.
These known differences between related states make it possible to use a
competing risks model to estimate the probability an individual quits being a nascent
for potentially competing reasons.  In the case of this chapter, the competing reasons
are that the nascent chooses either quitting the effort of firm formation or successfully
founds an operating firm.
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This chapter includes data from all waves of the PSED.  The complete PSED
includes only those respondents who were identified as nascent entrepreneurs in the
initial wave.  The competing risks hazard model for nascent entrepreneur success in
operating a firm, as an example, estimates the competing risks of an individual
nascent entrepreneur operating a firm versus the possibility that nascent decides to
quit or otherwise remains in the data.  While the multinomial logit model requires a
complete panel, the competing risks hazard model actually utilizes the fact that
nascent entrepreneurs drop out of the data for identifiable reasons.  In the competing
risks hazard model, modeling the nascent entrepreneur’s success at having an
operating firm (or, alternatively, the nascent entrepreneur’s choice of quitting) in a
given period is similar to modeling the probability of an instantaneous risk occurring
at time t prior to a known end time T according to the hazard function:
(8)
This function describes the chance an event occurs between observed time periods
conditional on the individual being observed at time t.  
Allison (1990, ch. 6) states that the general form for the Cox proportional
competing risks hazard function, h(t), with k coefficients and baseline hazard á(t), is
the following:
(9)
It should be noted that not all of the  need to vary over time.  Additionally, the
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Cox proportional hazard model is semi-parametric since the baseline hazard, á(t), is
estimated without specifying any distributional assumptions about its form.
Regressors for the models estimated in this chapter have been chosen to reflect
items that could affect the success or failure of the nascent entrepreneur.  The primary
regressors of interest in the model are the ability of the nascent entrepreneur to
establish a firm, the resources that the nascent entrepreneur has available, the
commitment the nascent entrepreneur demonstrates in establishing the firm, and the
management decisions the nascent entrepreneur has made in developing the firm.  In
general, any regressor that increases the hazard that a nascent entrepreneur has an
operating firm will decrease the hazard that a nascent entrepreneur decides to quit.  A
list of these regressors can be found in Table 10 and the summary statistics for these
regressors can be found in Table 11.
The ability of the nascent entrepreneur in operating a firm is represented by
having a parent that was self-employed, having a friend that owns a business, self-
employed during the initial wave of surveying, and the work experience of the nascent
entrepreneur.  These variables are intended to proxy for the nascent entrepreneur’s
skills in operating a firm, since direct measures of these skills are unavailable.  In
particular, being self-employed during the initial wave is a proxy for serial
entrepreneurship.  Serial entrepreneurs are found to be different from other
entrepreneurs in their abilities to create operating firms (Westhead, et al. 2005), due to
the experience these individuals have gained from past entrepreneurial ventures.  It is
expected that all of these regressors except work experience increase the hazard of the
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Table 10. Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Name Definition
Female Female = 1
Nonwhite Nonwhite = 1
Age Age at time of survey
Born in the U.S. Born in the U.S. = 1
Education Years of education
Married Married = 1
Number of Children Number of children under age 18
Parent was Self-employed At least one parent of respondent was self-employed = 1
Friend Owns Business At least one friend of respondent owns a business = 1
Positive Economic Outlook Has positive economic outlook at initial wave = 1
Years of Work Experience Total Years of Work Experience
Years Living in Current County Years Living in Current County
Prefers Doing Things “Better” Prefers doing things “better” = 1
Unemployed at Initial Wave Unemployed at initial wave = 1
Retired at Initial Wave Retired at initial wave = 1
ln(Initial Wave Income) Natural log of income at initial wave
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) Net Worth ($10,000) at initial wave
Homeowner Homeowner = 1
Employed by Others Employed by others = 1
Venture with Employer Venture planned with initial wave employer = 1
Self-employed at Initial Wave Self-employed at initial wave = 1
Venture has Business Plan Some form of business plan for venture exists = 1
Business Assistance Requested Some business assistance program has been contacted = 1
Midwest Respondent lives in the Midwest = 1
South Respondent lives in the South = 1
West Respondent lives in the West = 1
Micropolitan County County population exceeds 10,000 but is less than 50,000 = 1
Rural County County population less than 10,000 = 1
62
Table 11. Summary Statistics (* are time invariant)
Variable Name Obs. M ean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female* 3,320 0.486 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite* 3,300 0.378 0.485 0 1
Age 3,312 39.581 11.168 18 74
Born in the U.S.* 3,204 0.916 0.277 0 1
Education* 3,304 15.067 2.604 8 20
Married 2,375 0.581 0.493 0 1
Number of Children* 3,284 1.119 1.316 0 7
Parent was Self-employed* 3,320 0.5 0.5 0 1
Friend Owns Business* 3,320 0.728 0.445 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook* 3,320 0.51 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience* 3,252 17.443 10.705 0 60
Years Living in Current County* 3,224 17.398 14.441 0.167 64
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 2,375 0.674 0.469 0 1
Unemployed* 3,320 0.12 0.326 0 1
Retired* 3,320 0.031 0.174 0 1
ln(Initial Wave Income)* 3,176 10.726 0.721 8.006 14.403
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000)* 3,168 2.532 4.079 -3.8 26
Initial Wave Net Worth Squared/1,000* 3,168 0.023 0.08 0 0.676
Homeowner 2,355 0.708 0.455 0 1
Employed by Others 2,359 0.614 0.487 0 1
Venture with Initial Wave Employer* 3,320 0.142 0.349 0 1
Self-Employed at Initial Wave* 2,375 0.648 0.478 0 1
Venture has Business Plan 3,320 0.665 0.472 0 1
Business Assistance Requested 3,320 0.194 0.396 0 1
Midwest* 3,320 0.214 0.411 0 1
South* 3,320 0.36 0.48 0 1
West* 3,320 0.234 0.423 0 1
Micropolitan County* 3,320 0.086 0.281 0 1
Rural County* 3,320 0.297 0.457 0 1
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nascent entrepreneur establishing a firm and reduce the hazard of the nascent
entrepreneur choosing to quit.  The effect of work experience may increase the hazard
of having an operating firm due to the business knowledge this may reflect, as
indicated by Lazear’s (2005) theoretical model.  However, it may instead reduce the
hazard of having an operating firm due to the potential for other opportunities for the
nascent entrepreneur due to this experience, or have no effect at all.  Lazear (2005)
found no effect.
The resources available to the entrepreneur are modeled using two separate
approaches.  First, the financial resources of the nascent entrepreneur are represented
by the natural log of the initial wave income of the nascent entrepreneur, the initial
wave net worth and its square, and whether the nascent entrepreneur owns a home. 
Second, the resource network available for the nascent entrepreneur to draw upon is
represented in the model by the number of years the nascent entrepreneur has lived in
the county they reside and whether the nascent entrepreneur is establishing a firm with
the employer the nascent entrepreneur had in the initial wave.
The initial wave income and net worth are used in order to avoid possible
endogeneity of these measures in the model, since these measures are affected by the
potential operation of a firm and the potential return to employed work by the nascent
entrepreneur.  The nascent entrepreneur with greater financial resources is expected to
be more likely to establish a firm (Holtz-Eakin, et al. 1994b), just as a self-employed
individual with greater financial resources is found to remain self-employed longer
(Georgellis, et al. 2007).  However, the expectation of the initial income and wealth
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on the hazard of quitting is not necessarily obvious.  In part, a greater amount of
financial resources may reduce the hazard of quitting by increasing the hazard of
having an operating firm.  However, a larger amount of either income or net worth
may increase the hazard of the nascent entrepreneur choosing to quit because the
higher wealth may represent a more valuable option to the nascent entrepreneur than
the possibility of self-employment (Amit, et al. 1995).
The potential size of the nascent entrepreneur’s resource network is
represented both by whether the nascent entrepreneur is planning the firm with a
recent employer and by the length of time the nascent entrepreneur has been a resident
of the county where the firm will be established.  The nascent entrepreneur with the
larger resource network is expected to be the nascent entrepreneur with the higher
hazard of having an operating firm (Shane and Cable 2002).  The nascent
entrepreneur that is planning a firm with a recent employer is expected to be more
likely to establish a firm due to the access to the recent employer’s resources.  The
nascent entrepreneur who has lived in the county where the firm is to be established is
reasonably believed to have a access to a larger number of local resources as the result
of the longer residency – that is, it is expected that residing in one place allows the
nascent entrepreneur to find more friends and have a greater knowledge of local
resources.  Thus, a nascent entrepreneur with a longer local residency is expected to
be more likely to have the firm operating and, conversely, to be less likely to quit the
firm formation effort.
The commitment of the nascent entrepreneur to establishing a firm is
65
represented by whether the nascent entrepreneur has a positive outlook for the local
economy, whether the nascent entrepreneur was unemployed or retired during the
initial wave of the survey, and whether the nascent entrepreneur is employed by others
in a given wave of the survey.  Perceptual and demographic variables such as these
have been found to be important determinants of a nascent entrepreneur’s success
(Arenius and Minniti 2005).  It is expected that a nascent entrepreneur with a positive
outlook for the economy is more optimistic about the potential firm’s opportunities
and, therefore, more likely to be committed to establishing the firm.  An unemployed
nascent entrepreneur may have a lower hazard of establishing a firm – and a higher
hazard of quitting – if another opportunity is presented to the nascent entrepreneur
(Amit, et al. 1995).  A retired nascent entrepreneur may have a similar hazard as the
unemployed nascent entrepreneur due to the known option for this nascent
entrepreneur of returning to retirement.  If the nascent entrepreneur continues to be
employed by others, or returns to such employment, then that nascent entrepreneur
may be less committed to establishing the firm as a result of this employment. 
Vivarelli (2004) finds that the entrepreneur’s commitment to the venture is an
important determinant of the firm’s success.  The preference for doing things “better”
is the final perceptual variable included.
Finally, two measures of firm management are expected to have an effect on
both the hazard of establishing a firm and the hazard of quitting.  First, a regressor for
whether a business plan has been created for the firm is included and this regressor is
expected to have a positive effect on the establishment of an operating firm.  Second,
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a regressor for whether a business assistance program has been contacted is included. 
In part, these regressors are measures of the strategic choices the nascent entrepreneur
has made toward the establishment of the firm.  Littunen (2000) finds that strategy has
an effect on the growth of a firm.  Both regressors are expected to increase the hazard
of establishing a firm and reduce the hazard of quitting.
Additionally, regional measures and demographic measures are included in the
model to reflect the effects of local area characteristics and demographics on the
hazards of either establishing a firm or quitting the effort.  Storey and Wynarczyk
(1996) find that local and regional characteristics are important to a firm’s success. 
Three indicator measures of the nascent entrepreneur’s location are included –
midwest, south, and west.  The base measure of the model is for a nascent
entrepreneur located in the northeastern United States.  In addition, two area size
indicators are included in the model – micropolitan and rural.  The base measure is for
a metropolitan nascent entrepreneur, that is, one that resides in a county with a
population greater than 50,000.  A micropolitan area is defined as a county with a
population between 10,000 and 50,000, while a rural county has a population of less
than 10,000.  Measures for demographic characteristics of the nascent entrepreneur
are if the nascent entrepreneur is female, the age of the nascent entrepreneur, whether
the nascent entrepreneur was born in the United States, the education of the nascent
entrepreneur, the marital status of the nascent entrepreneur, and the nascent
entrepreneur’s number of children.
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Data
This chapter uses data from the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
(PSED) to evaluate the competing risks hazard model of a nascent entrepreneur
having an operating firm and the competing risks hazard model of a nascent
entrepreneur choosing to quit planning a firm.  Gartner, et al., 2004 explain that the
PSED was developed in response to the need for data that identifies entrepreneurs at
stages earlier than self-employment.  Nascent entrepreneurs are individuals who are in
the planning stages of creating a firm. While there is some discussion of the definition
of the entrepreneur and how best to study entrepreneurship (e.g., Venkataraman
1998), this chapter will use the nascent entrepreneurship definition in order to stay
true to the data from the survey.
The PSED contains responses from 830 nascent entrepreneurs over four waves
taken between 1998 and 2003.  For each respondent, each subsequent wave of the
survey was conducted approximately twelve months following the previous wave. 
The first wave contains observations from surveys conducted between 1998 and 2000. 
It should be noted that the first opportunity in the PSED for a nascent to be identified
either as having an operating firm or as choosing to quit is in the second wave.
The measures for region location – midwest, south, and west – are taken
directly from the PSED, however the population-based measures are from a different
source.  The PSED includes state and county Federal Information Processing
Standards (FIPS) identifiers for each respondent.  The inclusion of the state and
county FIPS number provides a means of matching outside data with the PSED.  In
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the case of the population-based measures – micropolitan and rural – the state and
county population for each respondent is taken from the Regional Economic Accounts
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The county-level population for each
given wave of the data is matched to the respondent for the year in which the
respondent completed that particular wave of the survey.
Summary statistics of the data used in the analysis are found in Table 11.  The
varying number of observations with non-missing data for each regressor is a result of
the attrition of nascent entrepreneurs from the data.  Relevant observation counts for
each model are provided with the empirical results, which are discussed in the
following section.
Empirical Results
Three specifications are estimated for each of the competing risks hazard
models – nascent entrepreneur operating and nascent entrepreneur quitting.  The first
specification of each model is the full model, with all regressors included.  The
second model removes the potentially endogenous measures of income and net worth. 
These regressors are defined using the initial wave measures for income and net worth
in order to reduce possible endogeneity, which would bias the estimates of the model. 
However, since it is possible for a nascent entrepreneur either to attain firm operation
or choose to quit prior to the second wave, the measures of income and net worth
even in this wave may be directly linked to the firm being started.  Therefore, the
analysis estimates a second specification, which removes income and net worth
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measures.  The final specification removes the regressors for marital status,
homeownership, whether one is employed by others, whether the venture has a
business plan, and whether business assistance has been requested.  These regressors,
too, may be endogenous to the hazards of operating or quitting.
The results of the models of nascent entrepreneur operating are reported in
Table 12 and the results of the models of nascent entrepreneur quitting are reported in
Table 13.  Coefficients for each specification are reported, rather than the hazard
ratios, for the benefit of readers less familiar with competing risks hazard models.  In
general, a model’s hazard ratio is estimated, however this requires the reader to
compare the value to unity, rather than interpreting the sign.  When the coefficients
are reported, it is possible to follow the more natural interpretation of effects by using
the sign of the coefficient.  Additionally, robust standard errors are used in all
specifications.
It must be noted that a number of respondents are dropped from the sample
due to non-response.  These cases are not treated as either operating or quitting, but
are instead removed from the analysis.  These respondents all have net worth below
$25,000, therefore it is expected that they are more likely to have quit early than to
have operated early.  If these respondents had been included, they would likely reduce
the timing of quitting and possibly increase the timing of operating and may have an
impact on the wealth and income estimates.  Other than their net worth being lower
than the rest of the sample, these respondents do not pool in any other variable.  Thus,
these respondents’ impact on the remaining coefficients is unclear.
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Table 12. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Operation

























































































ln(Initial Wave Income) 0.099
[0.089]
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) 0.019
[0.030]







Table 12. Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Operation, continued
Operating 1 Operating 2 Operating 3






















































Number of Observations 1,833 1,911 1,915
Number of Subjects 734 767 767
Number of Failures 265 273 2761
Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1. Defined as the number of subjects that leave the data for the reason modeled.
Model of Nascent Entrepreneur Operation
Several demographic variables have a statistically insignificant effect on firm
operation.  First, women are found to be the same as men in terms of getting a firm
operational.  Second, being born in the United States does not affect the chances of a
nascent entrepreneur having an operational firm.  Third, education does not have an
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effect on getting a firm operational, neither does the nascent entrepreneur’s number of
children.  Fourth, marital status is, at best, marginally significant to firm operation.
However, nonwhites have a lower hazard of having an operating firm.  This
result is similar to Fairlie and Meyer (1996), who find that nonwhites are less likely to
be self-employed than whites.  Additionally, older nascent entrepreneurs have a lower
hazard of having an operating firm.
In terms of the ability of the nascent entrepreneur, the results are mixed. 
Having either a self-employed parent or friend has no effect on whether the firm is
operational.  However, a nascent entrepreneur with more work experience is more
likely to have a firm operate.  Being self-employed during the initial wave of the
PSED also increases the nascent entrepreneur’s chances of getting a firm operating,
supporting the serial entrepreneurship results of Westhead, et al. (2005).
The effect of resources on the hazard of firm operation are also mixed.  None
of the financial resource measures – log of income, net worth, square of net worth, or
owning a home – have a significant effect on firm operation.  Neither does the
network resource measure of the nascent entrepreneur’s time of residence.  These
results are in contrast to past research on the self-employed, such as Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) who found that assets significantly increase an individual’s
probability of self-employment.  Here, though, an individual nascent entrepreneur’s
financial resources have no significant effect on that nascent entrepreneur’s hazard of
having an operating firm (i.e., becoming self-employed).  This further supports the
contentions of chapter two, that defining entrepreneurs exclusively as those
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individuals who are self-employed creates selection bias in the estimates of models of
entrepreneurship.
The network resource measure of starting the venture with a previous
employer does increase the likelihood the nascent entrepreneur’s firm becomes
operational.  However, as noted in chapter two, these corporate entrepreneurs are
quite different from other nascent entrepreneurs precisely because of the corporate
entrepreneur’s access to his former employers resources.  The result that starting a
venture with a previous employer increases the hazard of an operating firm further
substantiates that earlier finding.
The commitment variables are mostly insignificant to the hazard of firm
operation.  Neither being unemployed nor being retired prior to becoming a nascent
entrepreneur have an effect on the hazard of firm formation.  Neither does preferring
to do things “better” have an effect on the probability of having an operating firm. 
However, nascent entrepreneurs with a positive economic outlook have a reduced
hazard of firm operation.  Possibly, this result reflects other opportunities when the
local economy is good, or it reflects the overconfidence of the respondent nascent
entrepreneur.  Unfortunately, testing either of these economic outlook theories
requires data that are not available in the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics.
The management strategy variables, too, have differing results on the hazard
of firm formation.  Creating a business plan has an insignificant effect on the nascent
entrepreneur’s chances of operating a firm.  However, requesting assistance from a
business assistance program at any level – federal, state, or county – is marginally
  An example of this difference is that New York City and Philadelphia are both considered base cities2
in that both are in the northeast and are metropolitan areas.  However, most observers would recognize
that the economic conditions in both cities are not necessarily the same.
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significant and positive to the hazard of operating a firm.  Thus, firms that receive
assistance are more likely to operate.  This suggests that the government may play a
role in fostering entrepreneurial ventures.
The most parsimonious specification of the competing risks hazard model of
firm operation has only two differences in its results when compared with the other
two specifications.  First, the age coefficient in this specification only significant at
the ten percent level, where it is significant at the five percent level in the other two
specifications.  However, its sign is still negative.  Second, the coefficient for positive
economic outlook is no longer significant at all.  The significance of this variable is
also lower in the specification without income and wealth variables than in the full
specification.  The sign on this coefficient is negative in all three specifications.  All
but one of the remaining coefficients in this parsimonious specification have the same
significance and signs across all three specifications.
Finally, none of the regional measures are significant in the competing risks
hazard model of firm operation.  It should be noted that these are geographic and
population measures, rather than economic condition measures.  In this respect, these
results cannot be interpreted as meaning that economic conditions do not affect an
individual nascent entrepreneur’s hazard of creating an operating firm, only that
location and the size of the local population do not affect the nascent entrepreneur’s
chances of operating a firm.   There are no differences among the northeastern,2
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midwestern, southern, or western states.  Neither are there differences among
metropolitan, micropolitan, or rural areas.  In all cases, neither the location nor the
population of the county where the nascent entrepreneur operates changes that nascent
entrepreneur’s probability of having an operating firm.
Model of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting
Very few regressors are significant in the competing risks hazard model of a
nascent entrepreneur choosing to quit (Table 13).  In fact, only the regressor for self-
employed at the initial PSED wave is more than marginally significant.  Being self-
employed reduces the hazard of quitting just as it increased the probability of
operating a firm.  This result implies that serial entrepreneurs are more persistent in
trying to get new firms started.
Beyond this variable, only being born in the U.S., the years of residence, and
requesting business assistance are significant in the quitting model.  None from this
list are statistically significant at better than the ten percent level.  As it happens, all of
these reduce the probability of the nascent choosing to quit.  Even though the results
for both years of residence and business assistance are marginally significant, they
nonetheless bear some explanation.
First, nascent entrepreneurs that have lived in an area longer are more likely to
persist in firm formation.  This result may be due to the long-resident nascent
entrepreneur’s wider access to local networks, which results in that nascent
entrepreneur’s greater persistence.  However, it may also be due to the long-resident
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Table 13. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting

























































































ln(Initial Wave Income) -0.097
[0.096]
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) -0.031
[0.035]







Table 13. Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting, continued
Quitting 1 Quitting 2 Quitting 3






















































Number of Observations 2,015 2,101 2,105
Number of Subjects 734 767 767
Number of Failures 228 239 2391
Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1. Defined as the number of subjects that leave the data for the reason modeled.
nascent entrepreneur’s greater commitment to the local community in seeing his firm
to operation.  Regardless of explanation, it should be noted that in the model of firm
operation, this variable was insignificant.  Thus, it may be that nascent entrepreneurs
with longer residence are less likely to quit being nascent entrepreneurs, they are no
more likely to actually establish an operating firm.
Second, nascent entrepreneurs that have requested assistance from some kind
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of business assistance program – be it local, state, or federal – are more likely to
persist in their firm formation efforts.  It should be noted that this measures only that
business assistance was requested, not that assistance was granted.  However, it is
clear that nascent entrepreneurs who at least make an effort to gain assistance from
some level of program are more likely to persist and, as found by the models of firm
operation, more likely to establish a firm as well.  Clearly, effort on the part of the
nascent entrepreneur towards firm formation is a determinant of the success of that
effort.
A few differences are found between the specifications of the competing risks
hazard model of quitting.  In the third specification, the coefficient on education is
now slightly significant.  However, the sign is still negative.  Also, the sign on the
unemployed coefficient changes sign once the income and wealth measures are
removed.  In the full specification this coefficient is negative, but in the other two
specifications this coefficient is positive.  However, the coefficient is insignificant in
all three specifications.  Finally, the sign for rural counties is negative in the third
specification but is positive in the other specifications.  Again, this coefficient is
insignificant in all models.  There are no other differences in significance or sign
among the three specifications.
A Comparison of the Timing of Firm Formation and Quitting
The hazard function describes the rate at which respondents exit the data for a
particular reason—the hazard of firm formation or quitting.  Figures 2 and 3 are
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 Figure 2. Graph of the Hazard Function of Firm Operation
graphs of the hazard functions of nascent entrepreneurs leaving the data for each
particular reason – operating a firm and quitting as nascent entrepreneurs.  Each of
these graphs is the baseline hazard function evaluated at the mean of the covariates in
the full specification.  The hazard function of firm operating nascent entrepreneurs is
in Figure 2 while the hazard function of quitting nascent entrepreneurs is in Figure 3.
Nascent entrepreneurs leave the data at a faster rate due to operating than due
to quitting.  Comparing figures 2 and 3, the graph of the hazard function of operating
reaches its maximum earlier than does the hazard function of quitting.  Figure 2
shows that the timing of operation is mostly between the second and third waves.  The
largest number of quitting nascent entrepreneurs, on the other hand, leave the data at
the third wave (Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Graph of the Hazard Function of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting
Conclusion
This chapter examines the eventual outcomes of nascent entrepreneurs who
are trying to start businesses.  A model is developed to describe the competing risks
of a nascent entrepreneur becoming successful by having an operating firm or
deciding to stop trying to form a business.  This competing risks hazard model is then
analyzed using data from the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED).  The
competing risks hazard model has the advantage of being able to analyze data where
observations are lost due to attrition from the data for identifiable reasons.  This
attrition has been a problem in earlier studies, such as Parker and Belghitar (2005).
Similar to Parker and Belghitar (2005), it is found that nonwhites are less
likely to start operating firms and that business plans seem to have no effect on
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operating a firm.  However, unlike Parker and Belghitar (2005) it is also found that
the nascent entrepreneur’s ability, access to resources, and commitment to the firm
formation process significantly affect the nascent entrepreneur’s chances of getting a
firm operational.  Only one measure, the self-employment status of the nascent
entrepreneur, has a significant effect on a nascent entrepreneur’s hazard of quitting.
The nascent entrepreneur’s ability measures that have a significant effect on
the hazard model of firm operation are the years of work experience and the self-
employment status of the nascent entrepreneur.  Both of these regressors increase the
probability of a nascent entrepreneur having an operational firm.  Being self-
employed also reduces the chances of the nascent entrepreneur deciding to quit trying
to establish a firm.
One resource measure is found to have a significant effect on the hazard of
firm operation.  Starting a venture with a previous employer is found to increase the
chances that the firm will become operational.  Nascent entrepreneurs who are
working with a former employer have access to financial and other resources that are
not available to others.  No other resource measures – particularly, income and net
worth – are found to have a significant effect on firm formation in this model.  This
appears to be at odds with self-employment literature such as Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), who find that assets are significantly related to the probability an individual is
self-employed.  The fact that the hazard model used in this chapter finds that assets
have no effect on a nascent entrepreneur’s chances of operating a firm further
supports the contentions made in chapter two that using the self-employed as the sole
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measure of entrepreneurship causes selection bias.
In terms of the commitment or perceptions of the nascent entrepreneur, having
a positive economic outlook reduces the hazard of having an operating firm.  The
effect of a positive economic outlook on the potential for firm operating may be due
to the overconfidence of a positive nascent entrepreneur or to the existence of other
opportunities available to a nascent entrepreneur when the economic outlook is good. 
Unfortunately, neither of these possibilities can be tested with these data.
The competing risks hazard model that has been used in this chapter
demonstrates a useful tool for studying entrepreneurs.  As noted by Aldrich (1990),
entrepreneurship is a dynamic phenomenon where individuals choose to become
entrepreneurs or not at a variety of points of time.  This entering and exiting of
individuals from entrepreneurship means that any data on entrepreneurs will exhibit
this entry and, especially, exit of individuals from the data.  This chapter demonstrates
that competing risks hazard models are a useful tool for studying entrepreneurship




This dissertation uses the Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED),
a relatively new dataset on entrepreneurship, to study two questions about nascent
entrepreneurs.  The first of these questions, addressed in chapter 2, is about the
identity of these nascent entrepreneurs and whether they differ from the self-
employed.  The second question, covered in chapter 3, is about what happens to these
nascent entrepreneurs over the course of the firm’s potential formation.
The PSED uses a different definition of entrepreneurship than past studies in
economics, which have used self-employment (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic 1989,
Evans and Leighton 1989, Lindh and Ohlsson 1996, Blanchflower and Oswald 1998,
Hamilton 2000, Fairlie 2002, Lazear 2004, Lazear 2005).  In contrast, the PSED
identifies nascent entrepreneurs, defined as those who are involved in the planning of
a new firm, rather than as individuals that currently operate a firm (Gartner, et al.
2004).  The advantage of the nascent entrepreneur definition is that a wider variety of
entrepreneurs can be studied, in particular those entrepreneurs that do not succeed in
forming a new firm.  Studies that use the self-employed as the definition of
entrepreneurship suffer from selection bias, since the self-employed are successful
nascent entrepreneurs (Venkataraman 1998, Reynolds 1997).
Summary
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Chapter 2 of the dissertation compares the nascent entrepreneur with the self-
employed by using probit models that estimate the probability of becoming a nascent
entrepreneur or self-employed.  I find that nascent entrepreneurs do, in fact, differ
from the self-employed in several ways.  First, women are less likely to be self-
employed but are equally likely to be nascent entrepreneurs.  Second, having a parent
who was self-employed increases the probability an individual is self-employed, but
has no effect on the probability of nascent entrepreneurship.  However, having a
friend who owns a business has the opposite result, by increasing the probability of
nascent entrepreneurship but having no effect on self-employment.  Third, individuals
with a positive economic outlook are more likely to be nascent entrepreneurs, but a
positive economic outlook does not change the probability of being self-employed. 
Finally, retirees are less likely to be nascent entrepreneurs but retirement has no effect
on the probability of self-employment.
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by demonstrating that a clear difference
does exist between the self-employed and nascent entrepreneurs.  Therefore, studies
that use only the self-employed as a measure of entrepreneurship have introduced
selection bias in their results.  The consequence of this selection bias is that past
entrepreneurship studies of the self-employed have been based only on the successful
entrepreneurs, a point made clear by Aldrich (1990).  Thus, nascent entrepreneurship
is a more accurate definition to self-employment.
The results of chapter two imply that future research on entrepreneurship must
either utilize a much wider definition of entrepreneurship – such as the nascent
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entrepreneur definition used here – or must adjust to the existence of selection bias in
models of the self-employed.  Additionally, it is clear that better dynamic datasets are
needed to study these important questions, since the PSED follows only the nascent
entrepreneurs from the initial wave over time.  Several entrepreneurship researchers,
most notably Aldrich (1990) and Venkataraman (1998), state that entrepreneurship is
a dynamic decision that individuals are constantly choosing to enter and to exit.  As a
result, true longitudinal datasets are necessary to reflect this reality.  The PSED is a
good start in this effort.
Chapter 3 analyzes two possible outcomes for nascent entrepreneurs –
succeeding in starting a firm or choosing to quit the attempt.  A model is developed to
describe the competing risks of a nascent entrepreneur becoming successful by having
an operating firm or deciding to stop trying to form a business.  The competing risks
hazard model has the advantage of being able to analyze data where observations are
lost due to attrition from the data for identifiable reasons.  It is found that the nascent
entrepreneur’s ability, access to resources, and commitment to the firm formation
process significantly affect the nascent entrepreneur’s chances of getting a firm
operational.  Only one measure, the self-employment status of the nascent
entrepreneur, has a negative and significant effect on a nascent entrepreneur’s hazard
of quitting.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that the competing risks hazard model is a useful tool
for studying entrepreneurs.  As has been noted by Aldrich (1990), entrepreneurship is
a dynamic phenomenon where individuals choose to become entrepreneurs or not at a
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variety of points of time.  This entering and exiting of individuals from
entrepreneurship means that any data on entrepreneurs will exhibit this entry and,
especially, exit of individuals from the data.  This chapter demonstrates that
competing risks hazard models are helpful for studying entrepreneurship due to their
modeling of the attrition of individuals from a dataset.
This dissertation demonstrates that research on entrepreneurship continues to
add knowledge about this important economic activity.  First, this dissertation shows
that potential entrepreneurs choose to become entrepreneurs even when the income
from doing so is less than they might enjoy from paid work.  In short, the
entrepreneurial decision is a comparison of utilities and not incomes, as has been done
in the past.  Second, this dissertation establishes how a competing risks hazard model
can be used to analyze this dynamic decision.  In these two important ways, this





Figure A1. The Entrepreneurship Process
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 Figure A2. Graph of the Hazard Function of Firm Operation
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Table B1. Samples From Panel Survey of Entrepreneurial Dynamics
Total PSED Full Model Sample
Total Number of Respondents 1,261 1,167
Nascent Entrepreneur 830 751
Control (Not Nascent Entrepreneurs) 431 416
Self-employed Samples 1,261 1,167
Self-employed (Both Nascent Entrepreneurs and Control) 555 513
Not Self-employed (Both Nascent Entrepreneurs and Control) 706 654
Nascent Entrepreneur Sub-samples 830 751
Nascent Entrepreneur and Self-employed 457 418
Nascent Entrepreneur and not Self-employed 373 333
Corporate Nascent Entrepreneur 118 107
Nascent Entrepreneur and not a Corporate Nascent
Entrepreneur
712 644
Nascent Entrepreneur and either Self-employed or Corporate 513 467
Nascent Entrepreneur and neither Self-employed nor Corporate 317 284
Control Group Sub-samples 431 416
Self-employed and not a Nascent Entrepreneur 98 95
Neither Self-Employed nor a Nascent Entrepreneur 333 321
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Table B2. Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Name Definition
Female Female = 1
Nonwhite Nonwhite = 1
Age Age at time of survey
Born in the U.S. Born in the U.S. = 1
Education Years of education
Married Married = 1
Number of children Number of children under age 18
Parent was Self-employed At least one parent of respondent was self-employed = 1
Friend Owns Business At least one friend of respondent owns a business = 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. Has positive impression of the self-employed = 1
Positive Economic Outlook Has positive economic outlook = 1
Years of Work Experience Total Years of Work Experience
Years Living in Current County Years Living in Current County
Prefers Doing Things “Better” Prefers doing things “better” = 1
Unemployed Unemployed = 1
Retired Retired = 1
Net Worth Net Worth ($10,000)
Homeowner Homeowner = 1
Regional Business Ownership Regional proportion of non-farm proprietors to number of households
Regional Population Density Regional population density (1,000/square mile)
Regional Per Capita Income Regional per capita total personal income ($1,000)
Regional Income Distribution Regional percentage of households with income $75K or more
Regional Age Distribution Regional percentage of population ages 25-44
Regional Education Level Regional percentage of population age 25 or older with college degree
Regional Population Growth Annualized percentage change in regional population
Regional Unemployment Regional unemployment rate
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Table B3. Summary Statistics, Total PSED
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 1,261 0.509 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite 1,261 0.443 0.497 0 1
Age 1,258 39.893 12.18 18 93
Born in the U.S. 1,230 0.915 0.278 0 1
Education 1,257 14.866 2.623 8 20
Married 1,261 0.549 0.498 0 1
Number of Children 1,250 1.13 1.314 0 7
Parent was Self-employed 1,261 0.47 0.499 0 1
Friend Owns Business 1,261 0.698 0.459 0 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. 1,261 0.8 0.4 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook 1,261 0.49 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience 1,242 17.08 11.105 0 60
Years Living in Current County 1,236 18.31 15.477 0.011 93
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 1,261 0.712 0.453 0 1
Unemployed 1,260 0.132 0.338 0 1
Retired 1,260 0.054 0.226 0 1
Net Worth ($10,000) 1,214 25.189 39.418 -38 260
Homeowner 1,257 0.656 0.475 0 1
Regional Business Ownership 1,261 0.213 0.06 0.07 0.6
Regional Population Density 1,261 2.426 7.065 0.001 53.181
Regional Per Capita Income 1,261 20.305 6.824 2.185 52.498
Regional Income Distribution 1,261 9.306 5.56 0.876 33.345
Regional Age Distribution 1,261 32.718 3.219 21.1 49.1
Regional Education Level 1,261 20.712 7.817 4.795 52.299
Regional Population Growth 1,261 1.342 1.814 -2.041 11.827
Regional Unemployment 1,261 4.395 1.927 1.1 23.6
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Table B4. Summary Statistics, Full Model Sample
Variable Name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 1,167 0.51 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite 1,167 0.436 0.496 0 1
Age 1,167 39.922 12.165 18 93
Born in the U.S. 1,167 0.928 0.259 0 1
Education 1,167 14.877 2.597 8 20
Married 1,167 0.556 0.497 0 1
Number of Children 1,167 1.141 1.318 0 7
Parent was Self-employed 1,167 0.47 0.499 0 1
Friend Owns Business 1,167 0.706 0.456 0 1
Positive Impression of Self-emp. 1,167 0.8 0.4 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook 1,167 0.494 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience 1,167 17.015 11.086 0 60
Years Living in Current County 1,167 18.360 15.48 0.011 93
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 1,167 0.721 0.449 0 1
Unemployed 1,167 0.129 0.336 0 1
Retired 1,167 0.055 0.228 0 1
Net Worth ($10,000) 1,167 25.228 39.601 -38 260
Homeowner 1,167 0.658 0.475 0 1
Regional Business Ownership 1,167 0.213 0.061 0.07 0.6
Regional Population Density 1,167 2.296 6.68 0.001 53.181
Regional Per Capita Income 1,167 20.3 6.657 2.185 52.498
Regional Income Distribution 1,167 9.256 5.566 0.876 33.345
Regional Age Distribution 1,167 32.683 3.228 21.1 49.1
Regional Education Level 1,167 20.676 7.83 4.795 52.299
Regional Population Growth 1,167 1.352 1.835 -2.041 11.827
Regional Unemployment 1,167 4.394 1.935 1.1 23.6
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Female 0.466 0.499 0.485 0.5 0.336 0.475
Nonwhite 0.365 0.482 0.368 0.482 0.523 0.502
Age 41.207 11.922 39.63 11.103 35.72 9.725
Born in the U.S. 0.932 0.252 0.936 0.245 0.888 0.317
Education 14.945 2.676 15.085 2.55 14.374 2.486
Married 0.583 0.494 0.574 0.495 0.458 0.501
Number of children 1.146 1.32 1.125 1.317 1.252 1.304
Parent was Self-employed 0.526 0.5 0.502 0.5 0.458 0.501
Friend Owns Business 0.735 0.442 0.743 0.437 0.720 0.451
Positive Impression of Self-employment 0.854 0.354 0.846 0.362 0.85 0.358
Positive Economic Outlook 0.507 0.5 0.518 0.5 0.514 0.502
Years of Work Experience 18.661 11.531 17.369 10.64 14.794 9.192
Years Living in Current County 18.959 15.62 17.405 14.421 16.397 13.254
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 0.694 0.461 0.679 0.467 0.729 0.447
Unemployed 0.129 0.335 0.119 0.323 0.103 0.305
Retired 0.051 0.22 0.031 0.172 0.009 0.097
Net Worth ($10,000) 26.97 44.798 25.301 41.067 25.311 43.293
Homeowner 0.694 0.461 0.672 0.47 0.551 0.5
Regional Business Ownership 0.219 0.061 0.218 0.061 0.215 0.065
Regional Population Density 1.878 5.791 2.114 6.35 2.367 5.207
Regional Per Capita Income 20.165 6.534 20.354 6.598 20.18 6.762
Regional Income Distribution 9.262 5.518 9.314 5.404 10.033 5.743
Regional Age Distribution 32.735 3.365 32.784 3.247 33.033 3.312
Regional Education Level 20.561 7.844 21.013 7.844 22.056 7.957
Regional Population Growth 1.392 1.845 1.372 1.74 1.282 1.647
Regional Unemployment 4.38 1.879 4.387 1.874 4.273 1.773
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Table B6. Probit Models of the Self-Employed



















































































































Table B6. Probit Models of the Self-Employed, continued




















































Observations 1,167 1,195 416
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table B7. Probit Models of Nascent Entrepreneurs



































































































































































































Table B7. Probit Models of Nascent Entrepreneurs, continued














































































































Observations 1,167 1,195 654 1,060 605
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table B8. Probit Models of Corporate Entrepreneurs



















































































































Table B8. Probit Models of Corporate Entrepreneurs, continued




















































Observations 1,167 1,195 751
Coefficients are marginal changes in probability.  Robust standard errors in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table B9. Chow Tests of Differences Between Nascent Entrepreneurs and Others
Entrepreneurship Hypothesis Calculated F Statistic Rejection Level
Nascent Entrepreneurship is equivalent to Self-employment 4.676 1%
General Nascent Entrepreneurship is equivalent to
Corporate Nascent Entrepreneurship
3.197 1%
5% critical F(27, 1139) = 1.66, 1% critical F(27, 1139) = 2.07
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Table B10. Definitions of Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Name Definition
Female Female = 1
Nonwhite Nonwhite = 1
Age Age at time of survey
Born in the U.S. Born in the U.S. = 1
Education Years of education
Married Married = 1
Number of Children Number of children under age 18
Parent was Self-employed At least one parent of respondent was self-employed = 1
Friend Owns Business At least one friend of respondent owns a business = 1
Positive Economic Outlook Has positive economic outlook at initial wave = 1
Years of Work Experience Total Years of Work Experience
Years Living in Current County Years Living in Current County
Prefers Doing Things “Better” Prefers doing things “better” = 1
Unemployed at Initial Wave Unemployed at initial wave = 1
Retired at Initial Wave Retired at initial wave = 1
ln(Initial Wave Income) Natural log of income at initial wave
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) Net Worth ($10,000) at initial wave
Homeowner Homeowner = 1
Employed by Others Employed by others = 1
Venture with Employer Venture planned with initial wave employer = 1
Self-employed at Initial Wave Self-employed at initial wave = 1
Venture has Business Plan Some form of business plan for venture exists = 1
Business Assistance Requested Some business assistance program has been contacted = 1
Midwest Respondent lives in the Midwest = 1
South Respondent lives in the South = 1
West Respondent lives in the West = 1
Micropolitan County County population exceeds 10,000 but is less than 50,000 = 1
Rural County County population less than 10,000 = 1
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Table B11. Summary Statistics (* are time invariant)
Variable Name Obs. M ean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female* 3,320 0.486 0.5 0 1
Nonwhite* 3,300 0.378 0.485 0 1
Age 3,312 39.581 11.168 18 74
Born in the U.S.* 3,204 0.916 0.277 0 1
Education* 3,304 15.067 2.604 8 20
Married 2,375 0.581 0.493 0 1
Number of Children* 3,284 1.119 1.316 0 7
Parent was Self-employed* 3,320 0.5 0.5 0 1
Friend Owns Business* 3,320 0.728 0.445 0 1
Positive Economic Outlook* 3,320 0.51 0.5 0 1
Years of Work Experience* 3,252 17.443 10.705 0 60
Years Living in Current County* 3,224 17.398 14.441 0.167 64
Prefers Doing Things “Better” 2,375 0.674 0.469 0 1
Unemployed* 3,320 0.12 0.326 0 1
Retired* 3,320 0.031 0.174 0 1
ln(Initial Wave Income)* 3,176 10.726 0.721 8.006 14.403
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000)* 3,168 2.532 4.079 -3.8 26
Initial Wave Net Worth Squared/1,000* 3,168 0.023 0.08 0 0.676
Homeowner 2,355 0.708 0.455 0 1
Employed by Others 2,359 0.614 0.487 0 1
Venture with Initial Wave Employer* 3,320 0.142 0.349 0 1
Self-Employed at Initial Wave* 2,375 0.648 0.478 0 1
Venture has Business Plan 3,320 0.665 0.472 0 1
Business Assistance Requested 3,320 0.194 0.396 0 1
Midwest* 3,320 0.214 0.411 0 1
South* 3,320 0.36 0.48 0 1
West* 3,320 0.234 0.423 0 1
Micropolitan County* 3,320 0.086 0.281 0 1
Rural County* 3,320 0.297 0.457 0 1
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Table B12. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Operation

























































































ln(Initial Wave Income) 0.099
[0.089]
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) 0.019
[0.030]







Table B12. Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Operation, continued
Operating 1 Operating 2 Operating 3






















































Number of Observations 1,833 1,911 1,915
Number of Subjects 734 767 767
Number of Failures 265 273 2761
Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1. Defined as the number of subjects that leave the data for the reason modeled.
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Table B13. Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting

























































































ln(Initial Wave Income) -0.097
[0.096]
Initial Wave Net Worth ($10,000) -0.031
[0.035]







Table B13. Hazard Models of Nascent Entrepreneur Quitting, continued
Quitting 1 Quitting 2 Quitting 3






















































Number of Observations 2,015 2,101 2,105
Number of Subjects 734 767 767
Number of Failures 228 239 2391
Coefficients, not hazard ratios, are reported.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1. Defined as the number of subjects that leave the data for the reason modeled.
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